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UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS; WHEN
TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH
Linda Andros*
I. INTRODUCTION**
The 1991 war in the Persian Gulf brought the region to the brink of
chemical warfare. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's threat to use chemical
weapons against coalition forces raised the grim specter of untold casualties
in the desert. Not since the gas clouds unleashed in World War I has the
world been filled with apprehension at the prospect of such human
suffering and death. Questions abounded as to how Iraq could have
acquired such an extensive chemical weapons arsenal: How could a state-
of-the-art chemical weapons plant have been built? Who aided Iraq and
how? Previously published reports resurfaced, pointing to West German
firms as the culprits, apparently breaking West German laws cavalierly in
search of profits. Closer to home, disturbing reports allege that the United
States government condoned the diversion of billions in agriculture credits
to Iraq during the 1980s, which were used to finance Hussein's military
machine, including purchases for chemical weapons production.
With the crisis now over we would do well to step back from the
abyss and take a long, hard look at what forces have brought us to this
point and where they might lead us if left unaddressed. This article
examines how the United States and the international community can best
respond to a terribly complex problem. The first part surveys the history
and use of chemical weapons and the factors that are contributing to
widening proliferation and continuing scientific and technological
developments. The second part examines the failings of various interna-
tional efforts, in particular the deterrence model of the Geneva Protocol, to
* Attorney-Advisor for the Import Administration of the United States Department of
Commerce.
** In January 1993, a Chemical Weapons Convention ("Draft") was opened for signing.
One hundred-twenty countries, including the United States, have signed on. For the Draft
to go into effect, 65 countries must ratify it; none have done so thus far. The author urges
the United States to do so.
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contain such use, and reviews the current status of chemical weapons under
international law. The third and fourth parts analyze the difficulties the
United States has encountered when applying export controls to counter the
chemical weapons dilemma from a legal, political, and economic perspec-
tive, especially in the area of dual-use chemical precursors, which have
legitimate industrial as well as military uses. The fifth part reviews newer
multilateral efforts but rejects these as inadequate to achieve the ultimate
objective of preventing chemical warfare. It calls for a total eradication
and ban on all chemical weapons, their development, transhipment, and
stockpiling, and concludes with a strong recommendation for a multilateral
convention that includes mechanisms for independent verification
compliance, provisions for collective enforcement, and a harmonized export
control regime as the best response to assure global security in this area.
I. CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE AND RESULTING
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
A. History of Use
In 1969, the United Nations defined chemical weapons as chemical
substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, that are used for hostile
purposes to cause death in humans, animals, and plants when the primary
effect is direct toxicity. Although chemical weapons are generally
thought of as a modem means of waging war, their rudimentary use has
been traced back to ancient conflicts.2 Prior to the first World War,
chemical weapons were not seriously considered as a means of warfare as
they could neither be produced nor utilized on a large enough scale But
1. G.A. Res. 2603, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969). The U.S. Army defines chemical weapons as a chemical agent intended for use
in a military operation that can kill, severely injure, or incapacitate by its chemical
properties. See W. Hays Parks, Classification of Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1165, 1165-66 (1982). This interpretation does not extend to riot control
agents, chemical herbicides, or smoke and incendiary weapons.
2. In 600 B.C., the Athenian leader Solon was able to defeat an enemy by contaminating
the water supply with roots from a poisonous thorn. Phillip L. Reizenstein, Chemical and
Biological Weapons-Recent Legal Developments May Prove to Be a Turning Point in
Arms Control, 12 BRooK. L. REV. 95, 95 n.i (1986). During the American Civil War it
was accepted practice on both sides to contaminate water supplies while retreating. I&
At least one commentator has pointed to some evidence that during the Peloponnesian War
from 433-404 B.C. pitch and sulphur were burnt together to produce suffocating gases. See
Joseph B. Kelly, Gas Warfare in International Law, 9 MIL L. REV. 1, 3 (1960).
3. See VALERm ADAMs, CHEMICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL DIsARMAMENT 26 (1990).
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during the 1800s, developments in chemistry4 and in mass production
capabilities led to the understanding in the industrialized nations that
chemical weapons could well become significant to future wars.5
It was not until World War I that chemical weapons became militarily
significant because of their ability to cause widespread devastation on the
battlefield. With Germany's use of chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915 upon
unsuspecting and unprotected enemy troops, chemical weapons came of
age as true weapons of mass destruction." The effects of gas poisoning
were that opposing troops, forced to inhale the clouds of chlorine which
caused their lungs to fill with fluid, choked to death.7 The horror of such
terrifying suffering and death was widely depicted in gruesome news
accounts at the time.8
After Ypres, the race began to discover means of adequate protection
against these noxious gases and, at the same time, to develop other
chemicals that were even more effective casualty producing agents.9
These efforts culminated in the production of mustard gas, a chemical with
dual properties. It was persistent, and thus able to remain in lethal liquid
form for days or even weeks, and it was a blistering agent capable of
4. Id. at 26-27. Chlorine was a common industrial chemical widely in use by the late
1800s and phosgene was being produced commercially since the mid 1800s. aId at 26.
5. It was the realization of the potential for chemical warfare on a large scale that was
the impetus for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which prohibited the use of
asphyxiating gases in war. George Schultz, Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Conference
Held in Paris, Address Before the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(Jan. 7-11, 1989), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1989, at 4 (noting that the participants of the
Hague Conference(s) condemned chemical weapons because "the vicious effects of such
weaponry could be anticipated, even though our predecessors of 90 years ago had not yet
experienced their destructiveness").
6. William Lawler, Progress Towards International Control of Chemical and Biological
Weapons, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1220, 1221 n.7 (1982) (official reports of gas casualties
during World War I were put at 1,300,000, of which 100,000 died).
7. HUGH STRINGER, DETERRING CHEMICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLcY OPTIONS FOR THE
1990S 3 (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. ed., 1986).
8. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 25 ("a greenish grey cloud had swept down upon them,
turning yellow ... blasting everything it touched, shriveling up the vegetation ... [the
soldiers] were blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple colour-lips
speechless with agony, and behind them in the gas choked trenches... hundreds of dead
and dying ... It was the most fiendishly wicked thing .... "(quoting AMos FRIES & C.
WEST, CHEMICAL WARFARE 13)).
9. STRINGER, supra note 7, at 4-5 (Gas masks were given to British forces within a few
days of the first German chlorine attack. These provided effective protection against
chlorine. Thus, faster acting poisons such as phosgene were then utilized.).
2591992]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
penetrating through several layers of clothing.l" Hence, mustard gas had
a significant advantage over chlorine.1 The effects of mustard gas
initially caused eye and throat irritation, and after some hours produced
severe eye pain and blistering on areas of the body where contact was
made." The lungs would then blister and death would result from severe
damage to the respiratory system.13
In 1917, again at Ypres, the Germans first used mustard gas shells,
and casualty figures climbed dramatically.14 Although the British and
French rapidly produced protective gear against mustard gas, they also
began immediate attempts at manufacturing the gas themselves, and by
1918, allied mustard gas became available." Indeed, all sides were
simultaneously developing new chemical agents and only because the
Armistice intervened was actual usage preempted. 6 By the close of
World War I the major industrial powers had chemical weapons arsenals,
and some in the military, though still debating the relative utility of gas
warfare to produce decisive victory, began to view gas as the weapon of
the future capable of neutralizing entire armies without bloodshed.1
7
This was not, however, how the world perceived chemical warfare.
The vivid reports from the front of the mass horror and suffering, though
sensationalized and used as propaganda as some would argue, made a deep
and lasting impression on the international community. 8 From this time
10. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 35.
11. STRINGER, supra note 7, at 3-5 (Mustard gas could linger much longer than
chlorine, which was nonpersistent and dissipated much quicker. When gas masks were
adequate protection against chlorine, mustard gas was able to cause casualties percutane-
ously, which forced soldiers to apply whole body protection, considerably lessening their
mobility and staying power.).
12. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 35.
13. Id. at 203 (discussing in detail bodily effects of mustard gas).
14. Id. at 35 (noting that within two weeks the British suffered casualties of 14,000,
excluding those who died in the trenches).
15. Id. at 36 (noting that allies produced a Standard Box Respirator, which was
effective respiratory protection and a suit that was impermeable to mustard gas but highly
cumbersome).
16. Id. at 37 (noting that once the United States entered World War I it too was
manufacturing mustard gas by 1919).
17. L at 39, 52. See also 5 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE PREVENTION OF CBW
130-31 (1971) [hereinafter 5 SIPRI] (discussing the humane argument offered after World
War I that gas was actually less harmful and caused less suffering than conventional
weapons).
18. See 1 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE PROBLEM OF
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forward, chemical weapons were viewed as beyond any acceptable level
of battlefield brutality and somehow inherently immoral. Their loathsome
effects were especially feared due to the protracted suffering occasioned by
contact. Furthermore, chemical weapons knew no boundaries, and there
was much dread that such agents could be used against unprotected civilian
populations either by intent or inadvertence. 9 Additionally, the world
seemed fearful of releasing an entirely new technological mode of killing
with unforeseen consequences, weapons which could conceivably alter
even the natural order ° Between the two world wars,2" there were two
acknowledged accounts of chemical weapons usage.' At the outbreak of
World War II, after Hitler threatened that gas attacks would meet with
retaliation in kind,2 exchanges of mutual pledges to observe the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 were given by the French, Italian, British and German
powers. It appears that these mutual pledges, kept throughout the war were
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE RISE OF CB WEAPONs 233 (1971)
[hereinafter 1 SIPRI]. The International Red Cross voiced its concern in 1918 when it
protested vigorously against such warfare, and stated it could "only be described as
criminal." Id.
19. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that there were claims by the British that a
single bomb dropped in London would kill all within a wide distance, and a British
General, Sir Reginald Hart, was quoted as saying "in any future war, large cities and
extensive areas with men, women and children would be annihilated. Millions of lives
would be lost in a few hours by a gas bomb attack").
20. Paul Cassell, Establishing Violations of International Law: 'Yellow Rain' and the
Treaties Regulating Chemical and Biological Weapons, 35 STAN. L. REV. 259, 261-62
(1983); see discussion infra part Ill. From this global apprehension came the Geneva
Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the first use of lethal asphyxiating gases. Cassell,
supra.
21. See JAMEs M. SPAIOHT, AIR PowER AND WAR RIGHTS 192-93 (3d ed. 1947), cited
in William V. O'Brien, Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War,
51 GEo. L.J. 1, 34 n.88 (1962). Italy admitted it used poison gas in its war against
Ethiopia, but since the conflict was limited, it was treated by the international community
as an aberration. Id.
22. Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Restrictions on Chemical and Biological Weapons,
13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1192, 1195 (1982). Numerous accusations that Japan used gas several
times against the Chinese in the late 1930s were never challenged by Japan. See 2
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTTUTE, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: CB WEAPONS TODAY 125-228 (1971) [hereinafter 2 SIPRI]
(detailing alleged instances of chemical-biological weapons use from 1914-1970).
23. George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the U.S. Agree?,
1969 WIs. L. REv. 375, 381-82. Similarly, the U.S. did not use chemical weapons when
it entered World War II, but it did declare that it would do so to retaliate against a first
strike. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Use of Poison Gas: Statement by the President (June 12,
1943), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1947, at 507.
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based, in retrospect, upon the lack of preparedness of each belligerent as
well as the lack of knowledge as to what chemical weapons were available
to other belligerents.'
Beyond the constraints of unpreparedness and fear of overwhelming
retaliation, there was a real unease and distaste for chemical weapons
among many militarists, and as stated above, hostile public opinion further
impeded the development and amassing of chemical weapons between the
wars.2' Finally, there was the prohibition against first use of lethal
chemical warfare under international law pursuant to the Geneva Protocol,
which was in the main a result of the strong negative sentiment of both the
public and military factions.26
Given these constraints, first use of lethal chemical weapons in war
would not only subject a nation to possible retaliation, but would have
indicated to the world that the user was willing to pursue war aims "with
extreme measures."' This alone would have lead to anticipation of an
extreme response, which would serve to constrain further an initiation of
chemical agents into battle.2 It appears, then, for all these reasons, the
major belligerents were deterred from introducing chemical weapons into
the conflict.
B. Modern Practice
As seen from history, chemical weapons were not decisive in gaining
complete victory, but rather held a tactical military advantage: they
engendered a substantial psychological or 'shock effect'; they were
24. See 5 SIPRI, supra note 17, at 22. Though the element of surprise may be an
effective tactic in the first instance of chemical weapon use, there were no reliable means
to ascertain if retaliation would occur and in what manner and degree.
25. See id. at 21-25.
26. See discussion infra part I. Beyond the Geneva Protocol's prohibition against the
first use of lethal chemical warfare, many argue that it was precisely this built-in deterrent
that prevented the actual use of chemical weapons in World War H. See John N. Moore,
Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Biological Warfare: A Legal and Political
Analysis, 58 VA. L. REv. 419, 452 (1972). Despite Germany's discovery of nerve gas in
the late 1930s and its later production by 1942, Germany was deterred from using the gas
because it thought it was behind the Allies in chemical warfare technology. See ADAMS,
supra note 3, at 59; see Parks, supra note 1, at 1172. The Soviets believed that Hitler was
deterred because the Soviets had developed extensive chemical weapons after World War
I and were well prepared for chemical warfare. See C. J. Dick, Soviet Chemical Warfare
Capabilities, 14 INT'L. DEF. REV. 31 (1981); see also ADAMS, supra note 3, at 64.




difficult to defend against; and as with mustard gas, they could cause
severe casualties over extended time periods.29 Their value, then, can be
viewed as dependent upon the degree to which any particular chemical
agents display these characteristics and to the extent to which the user can
successfully manipulate them. Moreover, chemical weapons had historical-
ly been used only when an imbalance in military capabilities existed
between adversaries, as in World War U' Several recent conflicts appear
to bear out the proposition that chemical weapons have been used when
only the user had the requisite capability. 1
1. The Iran-Iraq War
During the Iran-Iraq War, from 1980-1987, Iraq began using lethal
chemical munitions on an intensive and systematic basis.32 By 1984,
there were confirmed reports by United Nations observers that Iraq was
using mustard gas as well as the nerve agent Tabun.33 By 1987, the
United Nations documented additional findings that Iraq had expanded its
29. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 9, 35.
30. Parks, supra note 1, at 1173.
3 1. The Soviet Union is alleged to have resorted to chemical/biological warfare, the so-
called "Yellow Rain," after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and through use of its
proxy in Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia) in the late 1970s. Parks, supra note 1, at 1173
n.24; see "Yellow Rain": Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans,
International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1982); Cassell, supra note 20, at 264 nn.21, 22 (describing reports of
aerial bombardments with weapons that release yellow or orange clouds of poison, which
fall like rain and allegedly cause dizziness, violent vomiting, and diarrhea and kills by
inducing massive hemorrhaging); but see Matthew Meselson & Julian P. Robinson,
Chemical Warfare and Chemical Disarmament, Sci. AM., Apr. 1980, at 38, 44 (arguing
that no chemical/biological weapons were used by the Soviet Union); Levie, supra note 22,
at 1196-97 (noting that Egypt is alleged to have used mustard and possibly nerve gases
against villages in the Yemen Civil War of 1967). There are also unconfirmed reports of
alleged United States use of chemical warfare in the Korean conflict from 1950 to 1953.
See Moore, supra note 26, at 437-38. During the Vietnam War, the use of defoliants and
incendiary weapons by the United States were thought to be in violation of the Geneva
Protocol. Id at 439-42. The position of the United States was that such chemical agents
were not subject to the constraints of the Protocol. See id.
32. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 85-86.
33. Tabun is a nerve agent that interferes with the blocking action of the human nerve
enzyme cholinesterase, which in turn affects the central nervous system. Symptoms of
Tabun exposure include cramps, vomiting, dizziness, convulsions, and finally death due to
anoxia. See STRINGER, supra note 7, at 5-6; ADAMS, supra note 3, at 203 (noting that
inhalation of high concentrations of Tabun can kill in less than one minute).
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chemical weapons use to include civilian targets within Iran along with
continued use against Iranian troops. Yet such attacks continued despite
increasing world condemnation. 3' Then, in 1988, western journalists
reported that Iraq had showered unprotected Kurds in northern Iraq with
cyanide and other lethal chemical agents. 3- Film footage and headline
photos of slain Kurds-men, women and children, bodies strewn in the
deserted streets of their villages-sent a collective gasp of horror
throughout the world. However, while such acts caused international
outrage, there was no further condemnation nor were any sanctions called
for by the international community.
The experience of recent conflicts, and, in particular, of the Iran-Iraq
War, seems to bear out the lesson of previous historical use of chemical
warfare: si vis pacem, para bellum.3' When there is an existing imbal-
ance between belligerents, as with the Iranians who were ill-prepared and
ill-equipped to meet the threat or retaliate, then lethal chemical weapons
can have a useful military purpose, although still not a decisive factor in
achieving victory. It also suggests that international law has been
particularly inadequate in preventing chemical warfare where such an
imbalance exists. More troubling still is the weak international response
to Iraq's aggression of first use of lethal chemical weapons, which may
well have lead to Iraq's gassing of its own civilian population, for Iraq
could hardly expect a challenge to its internal use of lethal chemical
munitions when its external aggression had merely received moral
opprobrium from the world.37 By its very lack of will, the international
community seems to have created what it has so long dreaded, an obliging
atmosphere where lethal chemical weapons can be turned against civilian
populations, where incentives can outweigh constraints.
34. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 87. The U.N. Security Council, in Resolution 582,
condemned the use of chemical weapons in the war, but did not explicitly refer to Iraq as
a violator. id.
35. ADAMs, supra note 3 at 87-88. See Guess Who's Still Running Iraq, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 6, 1991, at 39 (citing Iraqi Air Force killings of Kurds with cyanide gas at Halabja
and other villages at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, nearly three years earlier).
36. To keep the peace, prepare for war.
37. See Guess Who's Still Running Iraq, supra note 35, at 39 (Iraq again used chemical
weapons against its civilian population to put down the insurrection by the Kurds and
Shiite nationals in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. There was a mass exodus of
upwards of 1,000,000 Kurds from northern Iraq who fled for their lives in response to fears
of renewed lethal gassing by the Iraqi Army). Don Oberdorfer, Baghdad's Conspiracy
View of Recent History, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1991, at A12 (reporting that Saddam
Hussein had made a speech April 2, 1990, threatening to "burn half of Israel" with
chemical weapons if Israel attacked Iraq).
[Vol. 13264
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2. Scientific Advances Post-World War II
Nerve agents still represent the most toxic chemical agents capable of
managed deployment on a large-scale.33 Since the 1950s, there has been
some development of what are termed "incapacitating agents," which are
intended to produce temporary disability and may persist for several hours
or days after exposure has ceased.3 9 However, the actual known effects
of incapacitants on the central nervous system' ° have been too unpredict-
able to be a viable military option, at least to date.4' These agents are
also viewed as fundamentally inadequate compared to nerve agents: they
take longer to produce casualties the severity of which is less predictable;
they are easier to protect against; and they are more expensive because
higher doses are required.42 Still, the potential for new, more effective
chemical agents may be close at hand as toxins, which are natural
occurring poisons, are increasingly being developed through biomedical
research.43
A development of more immediacy in the area of nerve agents is the
binary weapon, which has been developed, according to official statements,
by the United States in response to the Soviet chemical weapons build-
up." The binary weapon's munitions casing holds two separate canisters,
38. STRINGER, supra note 7, at 24-25.
39. UNTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 3-9, 3-15 (1975),
cited in STRINGER, supra note 7, at 25.
40. Like nerve agents, incapacitating agents are categorized as casualty agents, as both
are intended to produce sufficiently prolonged disablement so that enemy forces would
become incapable of resisting. See 5 SIPRI, supra note 17, at 33, 47. Such incapacities
might induce affects like paralysis, temporary blindness, mental disorder, or recurring
fainting spells. Id. The rationale was that nonfatal casualties produced by incapacitants
would be more burdensome on enemy resources. It was also envisioned that this might
allow large-scale military operations to be conducted in heavily populated civilian areas
with nonlethal affects; the danger of killing is not more than one to two percent. Id.
41. Id. at 33. One such chemical developed for the United States was 3-quinuclidinyl
benzilate [BZ], a psychochemical that gives rise to a combination of mental and physical
disabilities that become manifest within a few hours but can last two days or more. Id.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Jonathan B. Tucker, Gene Wars, in 57 FOREIGN POL'Y. 58, 65 (Winter 1984-85)
("while only four major types of nerve gas are currently stockpiled, toxins abound naturally
and new types with bizarre properties continue to be discovered-thanks in part to the
growing use of toxins for peaceful applications, such as cancer therapy and biomedical
research... gene-splicing could be employed to engineer modified toxins that are more
stable...-).
44. The United States has been the only nation to openly declare its ability to produce
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each in turn holding chemicals, though not toxic independently, but when
mixed at bombing create deadly nerve gas. 45 Because nerve agents are
highly toxic, there has been a great deal of attendant hazard possible in
unitary munitions.4 This, in turn, fueled research to develop a binary
weapon which could exploit the capacity of nerve agents that were too
unstable to be stored for any length of time in unitary munitions and that
could decrease the hazard of production, storage, and handling of intensely
poisonous chemicals.47
This obviously creates the potential for increased proliferation of
deadly chemical agents inasmuch as the technology now exists to combine
hitherto non-toxic chemicals into highly toxic agents when mixed."
Moreover, there is nothing under international law forbidding such
development, production, or stockpiling. 9 In fact, there has already been
considerable proliferation in the form of dual-use chemicals, termed
precursors, which when combined form casualty agents, but standing alone
can have perfectly legitimate industrial uses. Key precursors for nerve
agents all have various uses in the petro-chemical and pharmaceutical
industries, such as in manufacturing pesticides, fertilizers, plastics, fire
retardants, and germicides." Furthermore, the state of commercial
binary weapons. See John G. Kester, The Chemical Warfare Review Commission-Two
Years Later, in CHEMICAL WARFARE PoLICY: BEYOND THE BINARY PRODUCTION
DECISION 1, 4 (Brad Roberts ed., 1987); see generally House COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF.,
99TH CONG., 2d SFSs., BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SELECTED DocUMENTs. The "Big-
Eye Bomb" and the 155mm artillery shell are scheduled for production but actual funding
has been withheld to date by Congress. Kester, supra.
45. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 150.
46. See 2 SIPRI, supra note 22, at 270-71.
47. Id. at 307.
48. Id. (There is the added attraction of easier availability as well, since a nation's
civilian industry could produce individual chemical agents in a normal industrial setting
without fear of hazard.).
49. The General Protocol forbids the first use of lethal chemical weapons in war. But
see ADAMS, supra note 3, at 156-66, 210-16 (There is a controversy among NATO
member-nations regarding United States deployment of binaries in NATO countries.
Congress put conditions on spending funds for United States binary munitions, whereby
the President had to certify to Congress that NATO members would formally allow binary
weapons on NATO soil. Some NATO members refused, for example, Norway claimed
it did not want to undermine the Geneva Protocol and that overrode any concern of a
Soviet threat. Thus, to date binary weapons have not been deployed in Europe by the
United States or NATO members.).
50. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 188 (Nontoxic chemicals used in manufacturing mustard
gas ethylene and ethylene oxide also have legitimate industrial uses. Phosgene, hydrogen
cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and chlorine are dual-purpose. Precursor nerve agents include
[Vol. 13
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chemical production today is quite diverse, and is expanding, with recent
estimates of over 30,000 private production facilities operating world-
wide.5 Finally, considerable global competition spurs on chemical
companies to constantly create new products and processes at a rapid
technological pace, which naturally creates a greater likelihood of
discovery of new precursors that could ultimately be turned to military
uses.
52
C. The Increasing Global Concern
We cannot delay. Time is not on our side. Technology is not
stagnant. Ever more lethal and insidious chemical weapons are
being developed-weapons which defeat defenses and are
devastating in their effects. The ability to produce such weapons
is rapidly spreading... [and] [n]one of us can escape the conse-
quence of chemical warfare.53
Then United States Secretary of State, George Schultz, sounded this
warning in his address at the Paris Conference on the prohibition of
chemical weapons in January of 1989.' In retrospect, after the threat of
massive chemical warfare in the Persian Gulf War, these words have a
most ominous portent. It seems that just as the world has gained some
security in nuclear arms control, it is "mocked by the spread of chemical
phosphorous trichloride, phosphorous oxychloride, and methyl, which all have a variety of
uses in the petro-chemical and pharmaceutical business and can be produced in civil
chemical plants engaged in legitimate production for civilian purposes.). See David A.
Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical
Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 31 n.128 (1990) (Ethylene is one of the most
basic of industrial chemicals in the world. It has an annual production of over 50 million
tons and is used to make plastics as well as being a precursor for mustard gas.).
51. 135 Cong. Rec. H4390 (daily ed. July 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Porter), cited
in Koplow, supra note 50, at 32 n.131.
52. 1 STPRI, supra note 18, at 36 n.22, cited in Koplow, supra note 50, at 33 n.139
(noting that the chemical industry is research-intensive with some sectors devoting 10%
or more of sales revenue to research into new products and processes).
53. Schultz, supra note 5, at 5 (It is the official position of the United States to call for
a convention to ban all lethal chemical weapons, including their development and
stockpiling.).
54. Id. at 4 (In response to overtures by President Reagan the parties to the Geneva
Protocol and other representatives of more than 100 nations convened in Paris for a week-
long conference to discuss the problem of chemical weapons proliferation.).
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weapons."55 Several factors account for their continuing use and prolifer-
ation. To begin, the increased use of chemical weapons in conflicts
following World War II indicates that nations are more willing to violate
international law if a benefit is perceived as outweighing any potential
backlash. Thus, erosion of the Geneva Protocol remains unabated.'
There is the difficulty of determining whether or not chemical
weapons have actually been deployed, which also has led to a certain
loosening of international norms. It is far easier to use chemically lethal
agents surreptitiously if it cannot be verified that such weapons have been
used." Even when conclusive evidence of such use has been indepen-
dently established, as with United Nations observers during the Iran-Iraq
war, the international community has taken no meaningful action, and has
relied solely on public condemnation for containment. Yet such practice
lends credibility to those nations wishing to develop and stockpile their
own chemical weapons arsenal, whether to avert a first strike potential, as
in World War II, or for more sinister aims. Either motive objectively
fosters a climate whereby newer, more exotic lethal agents can be borne
which will breed increasing global instability.
Moreover, the degree of military power imbalances in a world of
nation-states can only contribute to international apprehension that a
particular state may view chemical warfare as an attractive military option,
particularly against a weaker neighbor.5 Also, to the extent nuclear
weapons are not an option in limited conflicts, chemical warfare may be
a viable alternative.59
There is also an expanding worldwide capacity for the manufacture of
lethal chemical agents. Indeed, these chemicals have become techno-
logically easy and relatively inexpensive to produce compared with
conventional weaponry.' Small levels are now quite deadly because of
55. Id. at 5.
56. See discussion infra part III.
57. See Cassell, supra note 20 (arguing that because false allegations cannot be
disproven and true allegations cannot be verified, it leaves an unstable and dangerous
global environment; thus a permanent international organization is needed to establish an
independent, reliable verification mechanism).
58. Commentators have argued that some chemical munitions would indeed furnish a
highly effective means of warfare. See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 14; see Joseph D.
Douglass, Jr., The Challenge of Bio-Chemical Warfare, 3 GLOB. AFF. 156, 158 (1988)
(arguing from a military perspective that it is better to incapacitate enemy troops thereby
tying up their resources rather than to kill the enemy outright); see supra, note 40.
59. ADAMs, supra note 3, at 9-10 (discussing military requirements for successful use
of chemical agents in warfare).
60. Douglass, supra note 58, at 157-58; Livingstone & Douglass, CBW: The Poor
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the tremendous increase in potency. Further chemical precursors, many
common in commercial uses, have made it substantially easier for less
developed nations, particularly rogue nations like Iraq and Libya, to
procure precursors clandestinely on the world market and then proceed to
gain chemical weapons capabilities.6 Thus, when economics bar lesser
developed countries from obtaining highly sophisticated conventional arms
or nuclear arms, a relatively small investment in chemical arms can
translate into power that is out of proportion to a state's wealth or
international standing.62 Some commentators have gone so far as to dub
chemical weapons the "'Poor Man's' Atom Bomb." 3 In the hands of
Man's Atom Bomb, INST. FOR FOREIGN PoucY ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SECURITY PAPER 1
(Feb. 1984), cited in Koplow, supra note 50, at 14 (discussing expert estimates of the cost
of large-scale military operations against civilians: $2000 per kilometer with conventional
arms, $800 with nuclear arms, $600 with nerve gas, and $100 with biological weapons).
61. See Marshall Silverberg, International Law and the Use of Force: May the United
States Attack the Chemical Weapons Plant at Rabta, 13 B.C. IT'L & COMP. L. REv. 53,
77-79 (1990) (Evidence existed that during the 1980s, West German chemical firms
knowingly helped Libya to build a large chemical weapons production facility at Rabta,
which President Qadhafi claimed was a pharmaceutical facility. At first the West German
Government denied any firms were so involved but by 1989 it confirmed some West
German firms, including Imhausen-Chemie, did help build the chemical weapons plant.).
See Robert J. McCartney, Bonn Links 2 Firms to Unauthorized Exports to Libya, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at A29; Tyler Marshall, 3 Germans Sentenced in Chemical Arms
Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A16 (reporting that a Berlin court sentenced three
chemical company executives to jail terms and fines for their roles in illegally exporting
components of a factory capable of producing poison gas). See also Stephen Engelberg
& Michael R. Gordon, India Seen as Key on Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1989,
at Al (reporting that private Indian firms have sold large amounts of chemicals that may
be useful for chemical weapons to Iraq, Iran, and Egypt).
62. See 1 SIPRI, supra note 18, at 153. To the extent that manpower determines the
outcome of battle, chemical arms have appeal since they may well mitigate this imbalance.
63. See Koplow, supra note 50 (The latest United States official estimates of countries
having offensive chemical weapons capabilities, though variations exist among different
United States agencies, list between 14 to 20, including Iraq, Indonesia, and Thailand. At
least four of these countries have been longstanding recipients of United States military
aid; these states are Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and South Korea. Additional states that may
possess offensive chemical weapon capabilities are South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Ten
other nations are suspected of seeking to acquire chemical capabilities.); R. Jeffrey Smith,
Confusing Data on Chemical Capability: U.S. Intelligence, Diplomatic Lists of Armed
Nations Differ, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at A21; see Koplow, supra note 50, at 14 n.46
(Varying estimates as to which states actually possess chemical arms, which are attempting
to develop them and which have the industrial and technological foundation to develop
them in the future. There is a clear trend that numbers are rising with common estimates
ranging from 13 to 16 states, including the United States, the Soviet Union, France, China,
Israel, Egypt, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Iraq, East Germany, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia,
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terrorists or other fanatical groups, the scenarios for using or threatening
to use chemical arms are only as finite as our collective imaginations.
Thus, the relative accessibility and reduced cost of producing chemical
weapons of mass destruction, their flexibility in modern warfare, the
difficulty in verifying deployment in a given circumstance, and the reality
that such arms have been used by nations against weaker opponents in
violation of the Geneva Protocol, clearly demonstrates a present danger to
world peace and security. It is doubtful that any of these factors alone has
caused the continuing use and proliferation of lethal chemical weapons; it
is rather more probable that all have contributed in some degree to the
current climate. What can be said with more assurance is that the
international regime now in place has become ineffective and is a poor
guarantee for future global stability.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND
ITS INADEQUACIES
The international community has grappled with chemical weapons for
more than a hundred years. There has been a series of attempts to
proscribe behavior on the use of such arms, culminating in the Geneva
Protocol of 1925, but as of yet, none have adequately contained use, and
the Protocol is dangerously inadequate to contain modern proliferation.
A. Early Efforts
The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 prohibited both the
infliction of superfluous suffering in battle and the use of arms that would
make death inevitable." It is considered the genesis of international
attempts to ban lethal chemical warfare because it equated their effect in
battle to "useless aggravation of sufferings of disabled men.... ." The
Poland, and Ethiopia.); see Michael Satchell & Elizabeth Blaug, A Plague of "Hellish
Poison, " U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 1987, at 30; Gary Thatcher, Poison on the
Wind, Part I: The Poisons Spread, CHRISTtAN Sci. MoNrOR, Dec. 13, 1988, at B8-9;
John M. Goshko, Egypt Acquiring Elements of Poison Gas Plant, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
1989, at A20; N. Korea No. 3 in Chemical Weapons, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1989, at A9
(noting that other states that may already possess chemical arms or are thought to be trying
to acquire them include South Africa, Pakistan, India, Nicaragua, Peru, Bulgaria, and
Sudan).
64. O'Brien, supra note 21, at 17-18 n.43 (listing adherents to the declaration).
65. See 3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITE, THE PROBLEM OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: CBW AND THE LAw OF WAR, app. 3, at 151
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Brussels Conference in 1874 was the first multilateral convention to forbid
the use of poison or poisoned weapons and the employment of arms,
projectiles or materials calculated to cause superfluous injury. 66  As
industrialization advanced and discoveries such as chlorine and phosgene
became known, international efforts sought to ban chemical warfare.
Through the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, industrial nations
circumscribed the laws of war to preclude unlimited means of injuring the
enemy and signatories undertook "to abstain from the use of projectiles, the
sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious
gases.
" 67
The widespread use of poisonous gases in World War I engendered
universal abhorrence of what had become weapons of mass destruction."
In the aftermath, efforts were undertaken to ban completely chemical
warfare, but the victorious allied nations balked, pointing to the failure of
the Hague Conventions to prevent chemical warfare and to the perceived
impossibility of accurately verifying compliance of a similar ban. 9
Rather, the Allies declared that national security demanded that they be
free to maintain chemical weapons as insurance against a first strike.70
Thus, when the Treaty of Versailles, which formally ended World War I,
was concluded in 1919, only defeated Germany was prohibited under
Article 171 from the use, manufacture, or importation of asphyxiating or
poisonous gases."' Still, the Versailles Treaty did establish limited
precedent for the concept in international law of the illegality of chemical
arms per se.'
(1973) (wherein the parties would refrain from using projectiles against one another that
were charged with fulminating or inflammable substances).
66. Id. at 151-52; see Koplow, supra note 50, at 16 n.50.
67. First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899, in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 157
(1907); Second International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90
(Supp. 1908).
68. See discussion supra part H.
69. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 45.
70. Id. at 45; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 171, reprinted in 2 BEVANS 43, 119 (1969);
see Moore, supra note 26, at 431 (noting that the United States was not a signatory, mainly
due to the Senate's disapproval of certain unrelated League of Nations provisions).
72. Though never ratified, the Treaty of Washington of 1922 borrowed much of the
language of the Versailles Treaty and went even further by condemning chemical warfare;
its prohibition on use was to be universal and binding on all civilized nations. Treaty
Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan
Relative to the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Non-combatants at Sea in Time of
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B. The Geneva Protocol of 1925
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 is viewed generally as the most
definitive international effort at banning the use of lethal chemical
warfare.7 The Protocol prohibits the use of lethal chemical arms, but not
their production, transshipment or stockpiling. Thus, it follows the earlier
conventions that ban usage, but stops short of a more comprehensive ban
as the Versailles Treaty dictated to Germany. In fact, the United States
refused to sign the Protocol, at least in part, because it did not prohibit
export of lethal chemical weapons, and hence was of questionable
viability. 4 The Protocol is also constrained in other significant respects;
a party upon ratification or accession can reserve to be bound only as to
other states parties, and many states have qualified compliance insofar as
the Protocol would cease to be binding as against belligerents who resorted
to lethal chemical warfare." Hence the Protocol is widely regarded as a
prohibition against lethal first use in warfare only.76 The Protocol has
failed to address or anticipate the scientific and technological advances
made since 1925-the blossoming of commercial precursors, which can
become deadly weapons of mass destruction, are left to control by moral
persuasion." This hardly fosters an atmosphere of mutual forbearance
since no one state can ever be sure as to what other states, parties or not,
might possess. Moreover, with changes in national governments no nation
can ever be entirely confident that today's ally will not be tomorrow's
foe.
78
A separate problem concerns the scope of the Protocol. Over the
years there has been considerable disagreement as to which chemical
agents should be classified as weapons and, therefore, prohibited." With
War and to Prevent the Use in War of Noxious Gases and Chemicals, Feb. 6, 1922, 3
Treaties Conventions Int'L Acts, Protocols and Agreements 3116 (Redmond ed., 1923).
73. Reizenstein, supra note 2, at 95, 101.
74. See id. at 101 (the position of the United States was that the Protocol did not go far
enough as it did not prohibit export of chemical warfare agents).
75. S. MURPHY & A. HAYS, No FIRE, No THUNDER: THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 87 n.24 (1984), cited in Koplow, supra note 50, at 17 n.59 (Thirty
states have attached reservations to preserve the right to retaliate against the use of
chemical weapons, including the United States.); see Parks, supra note 1, at 1170-71.
76. Moore, supra note 26, at 449.
77. See supra part II.
78. Through a joint-stock company, Germany and the Soviet Union together
manufactured chemical weapons for themselves between the two world wars. See Levie,
supra note 22, at 1194 n.13.
79. Moore, supra note 26, at 429 (noting that the United States refused to ratify the
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the advent of incapacitating agents and the possibility of new, more deadly
chemical agents on the horizon, disputes among signatories will continue
without a mechanism in place for the international community to cope
effectively.
Lastly, the Protocol provides no regime for verification, enforcement,
or dispute resolution. As one might expect, such inadequacies have
allowed nations to use lethal chemical arms, at least against lesser foes,
with impunity. And because it is lawful under the Protocol to develop,
produce, and export such weapons, it invites continued development.80
These early efforts evince a recognition by the international communi-
ty that chemical warfare is inherently inhumane and immoral and that the
civilized world should join to prohibit the use of weapons that inevitably
lead to unnecessary suffering and death; and which may permanently
damage or alter the natural order. Yet nations with the capacity to produce
chemical arms have been unwilling to surrender a military advantage.
Here real 'politick' has prevailed over the greater interest of global peace
Protocol for fifty years because of a dispute over whether the irritants, such as tear gas,
defoliants, and herbicides, were covered under the Protocol).
80. The United States itself has had a checkered chemical weapons policy. After World
War II, the United States developed nerve gases and in 1965 Congress authorized $129
million for research and development. See ADAMS, supra note 3, at 147, 148. But by
1969, the research and development efforts of the United States were at a virtual standstill
as President Nixon renounced the use of biological weapons under any circumstances and
affirmed the commitment of the United States to a "no first use" policy for chemical agents
and incapacitants. See Moore, supra note 26, at 420. By the late 1970s, the United States
became apprehensive that the Soviets had massive chemical arms capability. By 1982,
President Reagan requested funds for upgrading research into binary weapons. See
ADAMS, supra note 3, at 155-56 (By 1984 the Chemical Warfare Review Commission was
named to review the policy of the United States. In 1985, the commission concluded that
the Soviet Union's chemical warfare capabilities posed a substantial threat; therefore, the
United States needed to update its old, inadequate stockpile of chemical weapons. The
Commission found that binary weapons were the best option. Production of binary
weapons began in 1987.); see Army Begins Producing CWs, Ending 18-yr. Moratorium,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1987, at A30; see Koplow, supra note 50, at 11 n.33 (detailing
amount of chemical weapons the United States has in storage, both within and beyond
United States territory); see also Max L. Friedersdorf, Chemical Weapons Disposal
Program, Address Before the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva (Apr. 4, 1989), in
DEP'T ST. BULL, June 1989, at 19 (describing the unitary Chemical weapons disposal
program of the United States; fifteen million pounds of chemical weapons had been
destroyed from 1970-77, and a new destruction site began operating at Pine Bluff,
Arkansas in May, 1989.); see aso Koplow, supra note 50, at 13 n.39 (The Soviet Union
had officially stated it had a CW stockpile of 50,000 tons, which was about the size of the
stock of the United States.). In January 1989, the Soviet Union declared it had stopped
production of chemical weapons and soon began destroying its own stock. See Moscow
Announces Chemical Arms Cuts, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1989, at Al.
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and security because nations historically have looked upon the ability to
retaliate against a first strike as imperative. Without such an ability, the
threat to national sovereignty and security is continual and, consequently,
destabilizing. The deterrence model of chemical arms control is premised
on nations being sufficiently deterred from first use only if they know or
believe that their adversary has a credible chemical arsenal. World War II
and the recent Persian Gulf War are proof of this premise. Hence, it would
appear that the best way to ensure that lethal chemical weapons will not be
used during hostilities is to allow nations to maintain updated stockpiles,
as provided in the Geneva Protocol. If, on the other hand, chemical
weapons are totally eliminated, a climate will be created for their
surreptitious use by stronger nations against weaker rivals, as illustrated by
the Iran-Iraq conflict.
However, the rationale for maintaining a credible defensive capability
to avert a first strike seems inadequate when applied to chemical weapons
(as opposed to conventional weapons) on at least three grounds. First, it
fails to account for the fact that conventional arsenals can stand as an
equal, if not greater, deterrent. Unlike a first strike with nuclear weapons,
which would result in a definitive victory, chemical arms are as yet
incapable of providing such a decisive blow from a first strike posture.
Therefore, merely updating conventional weapons can be adequate to
prevent a first strike, at least for nations like the United States. Second,
chemical weapons are unique. Like biological weapons, they possess a
development potential that could change the global landscape far in excess
of dual-use precursors or binary weapons, which are already destabilizing
in their potential effects. To permit the unfettered continuation of research
and development to maintain defensive chemical capacities, especially
when defensive needs can be met by conventional arms, hardly seems to
outweigh the risks of such scientific advances. Third, while according to
the deterrence model of the Geneva Protocol first strikes should be
prevented, the fact is that there has been infrequent but continuing
surreptitious first use by more militant states against lesser foes. There is
no evidence that deterrence advocates can point to that would show that a
total ban on chemical weapons would result in an increased rate of
clandestine usage. In all likelihood, no arms control regime can entirely
constrain nations bent on such usage, but in assessing the overall risks to
global stability, a total ban appears the best means to promote greater
international security.
C. Other Efforts
Even though its resolutions are not binding, the United Nations has
played a role in attempting to eradicate chemical warfare, chiefly through
frequent protestations that all states accede to and abide by the Geneva
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Protocol.8 By 1968, noting an increase in the capabilities of chemical
arms, the United Nations adopted a resolution to study the issue, 2 and in
1969 declared first use of such in armed conflict as contrary to generally
recognized rules of international law. 3 To date, while the United Nations
has bolstered the Protocol's prohibition against first use in an effort to
create binding customary international law, it has not dealt with the larger
problem of technological and scientific advances in chemical weapons
development, although it clearly has recognized the larger threat such
development entails.
In 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxic
Weapons and Their Destruction came into force." It is instructive to
look briefly at the Biological Weapons Convention ("BWC") to see how
effective it has been. Because it is a total disarmament convention that
calls for the eradication of all biological weapons for the sake of mankind,
it goes well beyond the Protocol's prohibition on first use only.85 But the
BWC does not promote sufficient disincentives for signatories to refrain
from clandestine use and/or development of newer biological weapons.
Rather, it presents a dichotomy; on the one hand it shows the nearunanimity of nations' views (at least officially) that biological warfare is
inherently reprehensible and a recognition that weapons research and
development should be stopped before the genie is let out of the bottle,
with possibly devastating consequences for all mankind; yet, on the other
hand, it reveals the unwillingness of signatories to accept limitations on
sovereign territorial rights for the purpose of maintaining an independent
81. G.A. Res. 706, U.N. GAOR, 7th Seas., Supp. No. 20A, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/23611-
Add. 1 (1953); Moore, supra note 26, at 429 n.32 (The U.N. adopted some six General
Assembly Resolutions by 1966, urging universal adherence to the Protocol.).
82. Lawler, supra note 6, at 1225 n.26 (A United Nation's study found that if chemical
arms were to be used on a mass scale, no one could predict the effects, regardless of any
protective measure capability existing. It also found that the danger of proliferation applied
to lesser developing countries as well as industrial nations.).
83. G.A. Res. 2603A, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1 Supp. No. 30, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969), cited in Lawler, supra note 6, at 1226 n.34 (The vote was 80 to 3 to
declare contrary to recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol, the
first use in international conflicts of "any chemical agents of warfare... which might be
employed because of their direct toxic affects on man, animals or plants. .. ").
84. Convention on Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons, Mar. 26, 1975,
26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 (88 signatories).
85. See Lawler, supra note 6, at 1220-26 (discussing differences between chemical and
biological weapons, the latter more readily given up by states because they had not proven
effective for military uses).
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compliance mechanism, without which it is difficult to see how greater
global security can be achieved." In reality, constraints that are self-
policed and ambiguous lead to misinterpretations, lax compliance, or
outright circumvention. In fact, since 1972, there have been reports, some
quite recent, that some signatories have used biological weapons, are
currently exporting them and are continuing research and development in
this area.' Hence, few would now point to the BWC as a workable
model for a total chemical weapons disarmament convention.
D. Chemical Weapons Under Customary
International Law
Use of such weapons [poisonous or noxious gases or other
inhuman devices] has been outlawed by the general opinion of
civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope
that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically
that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such
weapons unless they are first used by our enemies."
With these words Roosevelt characterized world opinion that the use
of chemical warfare was contrary to international law and a crime against
all civilized nations. But, the question remains: What is binding under
international law, and what is the status of lethal chemical weapons today?
At its core, international law deals with the conduct of relations among
nations." It is deeply rooted in the notion of consensus; each state being
86. Proclamation on Bacterial (Biological) and Toxic Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 (Article VI provides for the Security Council of the United
Nations to enforce violations, but the Security Council has not been utilized to date.).
87. Cassell, supra note 20, at 263-65 (detailing allegations of both chemical and
biological weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos, and discussing the inadequacy
of the Biological Weapons Convention to assure compliance); see H. Allen Holmes,
Biological Weapons Proliferation, Address Before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee (May 17, 1989), in DEP'T ST. BuLL., July 1989, at 43. See also [aUy
Weymouth, Is China Exporting Biological Weapons?, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21
(discussing that a secret White House report, the Pll Report, is said to reveal evidence that
China may be manufacturing lethal biological warfare agents and may be exporting them
as well-all in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention to which China is a
signatory).
88. Roosevelt, supra note 23, at 507.
89. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1986);
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (discussing
traditional bases of international law).
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territorially distinct and having a separate legal identity, but all bound by
a common interest in maintaining and advancing orderly relations.'
Because the rules of international law have evolved by the common
consent of nations, a proposed rule will bind no nation that has neither
expressly nor impliedly consented.9' The most common sources of
international law are set forth in article 38 of the Statute of the Internation-
al Court of Justice.'
In reviewing article 38 of the International Court of Justice it becomes
apparent that chemical warfare is now contrary to the laws of war as
developed by civilized nations93 and that a prohibition on the first use of
lethal chemical weapons in war is now binding on all states." One can
look directly to the number of treaties that have established prohibitions on
superfluous suffering in war as evidence of the intent and practice of states.
90. Louis HENKN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREGN PoLicY 33 (2d ed.
1979) (noting that the consent of a state is necessary for proposed rule to bind that state).
91. Id. at 33 (discussing the formation of international law through unanimity). If a
state does not desire to be bound by a rule of customary international law, that state must
manifest its intention not to follow the rule during the early stage of the rule's develop-
ment, and it must continue to express its opposition); see Michael Barton Akehurst, Custom
as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23-24, 53 (1977) (pointing
out that a state will be bound by a customary rule if it waits until the rule is firmly
established before expressing opposition.); see also JAMEs BRIELY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
57-59 (6th ed. 1963) (discussing treaties as a source of international law).
92. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 49 Stat. 1031,
T.I.A.S. No. 93 [hereinafter ICJ] (they are conventions, international customs evincing a
general practice accepted as law, general principles of law acknowledged by civilized
states, judicial decisions, and the writings of respected scholars in international law).
93. See Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons v. International Law: A Contextual
Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542-57 (1983) (arguing that the humanitarian rules of armed
conflict are binding international law, including the first defensive use of chemical weapons
and that nuclear weapons should come under the same rules). These rules include a
prohibition on weapons and tactics that cause needless injury (Rule 1), indiscriminate harm
to combatants and civilian populations (Rule 2), and severe damage to the environment
(Rule 3). Other rules prohibit disproportional reprisals from nations (Rule 4), and prohibit
nations from violating the neutral jurisdiction of nonbelligerent states. Id; see Daniel J.
Arbes, The International Law of Armed Conflict in Light of Competing Deterrence
Strategies: Empty Promise or Meaningful Restraint, 30 MCGILL L.J. 93 (1984) (Laws of
war represent fundamental standards of civilized conduct which must be observed as a
means of limiting the scope of hostilities between states.); see O'Brien, supra note 21, at
37-60 (for analysis of chemical weapons under the laws of war and the right of
reprisal-finding majority of international legal authorities hold chemical warfare against
international law).
94. Moore, supra note 26, at 449-50 nn. 118-22 (detailing legal scholarship in the United
States on prohibition of chemical warfare and right of reprisal).
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Although a bilateral or limited multilateral treaty is not evidence of
customary international law-it is a source of law that will only bind
signatories-some treaties can give rise to or become a source of interna-
tional law binding on all states. When such agreements are intended to be
adhered to by all states and are in fact widely accepted, they create
customary international law binding on all, whether signatories or not."
The Protocol would seem to belong to the latter category because it has
gained wide acceptance, having been ratified by one-hundred states.
96
One can also look to the actual widespread, longtime practice of most
states in refraining from the use of chemical weapons in international
conflicts, especially the restraint of the major military powers during World
War II. There is also a general recognition by states, as evidenced in
numerous United Nations resolutions and in declarations by individual
states, such as President Roosevelt's statement, that they are required to
adhere to the prohibition against first use of lethal chemical weapons in
warfare. Legal scholars now seem to agree that a prohibition on at least
first use of lethal weapons in war is now customary international law,
which is binding on all states, whether signatories to the Geneva Protocol
or not.'
But while first use of lethal chemical warfare is contrary to inter-
national law, retaliation in kind is lawful, presumably if such retaliation is
proportional. This in itself is troubling because, again, it serves to
encourage states to develop, produce, and stockpile chemical arms in order
to maintain a credible defensive strategy. Although there has been some
agreement among nations that chemical weapons and chemical agents
should come under a broad international ban, this is hardly evidence of any
independent lawful obligation." Indeed, at least four nations have
admitted openly that they possess both chemical arms and facilities, and
95. See REsATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 89, § 102.
The Genocide Convention and the Vienna Convention on Treaties are two examples of
such treaties.
96. Moore, supra note 26, at 450.
97. i at 451; see Parks, supra note 1, at 1167 n.l1.
98. See Lawler, supra note 6, at 1231 (The United Nations called for a complete dis-
armament and ban on all chemical weapons and development.). See Conference on the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jan. 7-11, 1989, in DEP'T ST. BULL, Mar. 1989, at 4,
9. The Conference was held in Paris and attended by more than 100 nations. The final
Declaration called for complete elimination of all chemical weapons and facilities and to




there is growing evidence that many other nations possess similar capacities."
It is apparent that one hundred years of effort to bring lethal chemical
weapons under a binding international regime has been of limited success.
The international community has been unable to prevent intermittent and
arguably increasing use, at least in part because the Protocol offers no
means of verifying such use, nor any means to enforce violations once they
are established. But as the BWC illustrates, this is crucial for confidence
and widespread adherence to an arms convention. Even more ominous, the,
international community has no mechanism to stem continuing proliferation
of precursors, nor any means to halt scientific research and development,
whose advances may well lead to a new generation of weapons of mass
destruction.
IV. THE UNITED STATES TRIES TO DO BETTER
Through export control laws, the United States has attempted
unilaterally to contain proliferation of goods and technology used in
producing chemical arms, including precursors. However, the magnitude
of global chemical production and rapid technological advances have
outstripped the United States' ability to do so. Furthermore, the extraterri-
torial reaches of some export provisions are likely to generate substantial
trouble with other nations.
A. The Export Administration Act
1. Background
Historically, nations have used trade controls to pursue political
objectives. Such restrictions on international trade can be viewed, to
paraphrase Clausewitz, as simply a continuation of politics by other means.
The United States has recently emerged as the nation most willing to use
export controls as a primary instrument of foreign policy.' e To this end,
99. The United States and the Soviet Union have openly declared they have chemical
munitions while Libya is said to have a plant at Rabta. See Confusing Data on Chemical
Capability, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at A21; see supra notes 61, 63. As a condition
of the cease-fire in Gulf War, Iraq has declared that it has large supplies of various
poisonous gases, including 75 tons of Sarin, 500 tons of Tabun, and 280 tons of mustard
gas, along with 1481 artillery shells and bombs containing chemical warheads. See Don
Oberdorfer & Ann Devroy, State Dept. Calls Iraq's Figures on Weapons 'Short of
Reality,' WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1991, at A1S.
100. See ANDREAS F. LOwENFELD, 3 TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 537 (2d
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the United States has developed an array of laws to control the export of
innumerable goods and technology to various and changing country
destinations."°' For the last forty years, the Export Administration Act
("EAA") has been the chief vehicle for maintaining export controls during
peacetime-" 2 The EAA originally gave broad authorization to the
ed. 1983) (trade controls used as an alternative to diplomatic or military means); see
Matthias Hentzen, United States Export Restrictions for Foreign Policy and National
Security Purposes: The 1985 Amendments to the Export Administration Act and Beyond,
26 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1-5 (Absent treaty obligations to the contrary, a state
is to determine with whom it will trade under international law as economic control is an
essential emanation of sovereignty.); see generally Homer E. Moyer, Jr. & Linda A.
Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and
Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1983) (discussing
the use of economic sanctions with specific case studies of sanctions imposed on Iran,
Afghanistan, and Poland); J. Curtis Henderson, Note, Legality of Economic Sanctions
Under International Law: The Case of Nicaragua, 15 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 167, 167-176
(1986) (analyzing the comprehensive trade embargo imposed by the United States upon
Nicaragua to attain United States political goals under The International Economic
Emergency Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982) ("IEEPA"), which
authorizes the President to prohibit imports from or exports to a foreign nation after he has
declared a national emergency in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
United States. Id. §§ 1701, 1702). "An economic sanction is an action taken by a state
or international organization to prevent, regulate, or otherwise hinder economic intercourse
for the purpose of condemning or influencing the target state's action or policies."
Henderson, supra at n.5.
101. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1985) (controlling actual weaponry
and munitions); Trading With The Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1941) (controlling trade
with belligerents); The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2704 (1954), as amended by
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1978) (controlling export of nuclear
materials, fuel, and equipment).
102. The United States imposed these controls under the Export Control Act of Feb.
26, 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-32 (1964)
(repealed 1969)). This legislation was superseded by the Export Administration Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-84, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-
2413 (1976)) (superseded by the Export Administration Act of 1979) ("EAA").
The renewed international tensions that contributed to Congress' decision to
maintain what were essentially wartime export controls also led, in 1949, to the
founding of NATO and the other regional treaty organizations. To ensure the
effectiveness of NATO and the other regional alliances, the United States
transferred military technology directly to its allies. In addition, as Western
Europe and Japan recovered from the war, they began to revitalize their
industrial capabilities and to challenge what had been virtually a U.S. monopoly
on advanced technology .... To prevent such technology from reaching the
hands of potential adversaries, it became necessary to establish a mechanism to
coordinate allied export control policies.
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President to control exports of United States commodities and technical
data to all destinations as he determined necessary for four purposes:
national security,"13 short supply,'" foreign policy,"~ and later, for
foreign boycotts."1
6
Such controls were not problematic until the late 1970s and early
1980s, when increased use by the President coincided with mounting trade
imbalances and clamors from business interests that export laws were
unduly inhibiting export trade." As export trade grew throughout the
1980s, so did Congressional apprehension over the extent of Presidential
authority under the EAA, particularly when such controls were harmful to
(1987).
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (National security controls are instituted to provide control
of exports making a significant contribution to military potential of countries that the
United States perceives as a threat to its security.); see Lorraine M. Cody, National
Security Export Controls: Congress Adopts an All For One and One For All Approach,
14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 573, 585 (1988) (The goal of national security controls is to delay
Soviet acquisition of certain dual-use technology; exports are also restricted to U.S. allies
and other free world countries due to Soviet efforts to obtain military technology through
illegal diversions.); see Dean L. Overman, Reauthorization of the Export Administration
Alternative: Balancing Trade Policy with National Security, 17 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
325, 376 (1985) (National security controls mainly affect duel-use items which have both
military and nonmilitary uses.).
104. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406. Short supply controls protect the U.S. economy from
excessive drain of scarce materials.
105. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Foreign policy controls are instituted to fulfill either
declared United States international obligations, such as restrictions on exports to South
Africa, or to advance United States foreign policy goals, such as trade embargo with Cuba,
Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Accordingly, as foreign policy goals change so do
foreign policy controls.); see Don Oberdorfer, U.S. to Lift Cambodia Embargo, WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A23 (The United States administration has stated that it will lift
its 16-year-old trade embargo against Cambodia as soon as the international accord on
Cambodia is signed by them in Paris.). See LOWENFEWD, supra note 100 (providing an
analysis of United States economic sanctions to promote foreign policy goals).
106. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (The foreign boycott provision is effectively a blocking
statute to stop American businesses from aiding the Arab boycott of Israel.).
107. See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Note, Export Administration Amendments Act, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 812, 829 (1986) (noting there were many in Congress who
felt compelled to promote exports as the only way to achieve a favorable trade balance
without resorting to protectionist measures); Hentzen, supra note 100, at 123 (noting
congressional concern that past foreign policy control decisions had given insufficient
consideration to legitimate United States economic interests at a time, in 1985, that United
States exporters were already suffering from a strong dollar and less expensive foreign
labor costs; while the mood in Congress was that most national security controls did not
justify their costs to United States enterprises).
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United States exporters and the outcome of such policies were uncertain,
or when restricted goods were already readily available on the foreign
market." The increasing tension between Congress and the Executive
Branch played itself out during the 1980s through the various reauthorizat-
ions and amendments to the EAA and were attempts to balance, albeit with
some confusion, the competing interests of enhancing America's economic
position in world trade with that of preventing the Soviet Bloc from
gaining access to American high technology for military purposes." Of
parallel concern was the attendant rise of the multinational enterprise and
with it the potential for diversion of United States export controls. Here
the Congress and the President agreed that the EAA would apply to all
goods and technology "subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.""0 and that
a 'person' under the EAA would include not only United States nationals
and corporations, but foreign nationals and corporations as well."'
Congress also acquiesced in imposing restraints on three categories of
foreign exports: (1) re-exports of United States origin goods or technology
by a foreign person; (2) exports of foreign-origin goods (incorporated
abroad) that include United States origin parts or components; and (3)
108. After World War II, international trade played a relatively small pan in the overall
United States economy; even by the late 1960s it was only three percent of the Gross
National Product, but by 1990, export trade accounted for 8-10% of the Gross National
Product. See Cody, supra note 103, at 587 (A major problem has involved delays in the
export licensing process which United States business claimed was causing a substantially
negative affect. Due to the inherent uncertainty, foreign purchasers regard United States
sources as unreliable.).
109. See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., The Future of National Security Export Controls, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 191 (1988) (noting that the increasing complexity of export
controls provoked concerns about unintended results that could harm the domestic economy
in the United States, as well as hasten the relative decline of the technological supremacy
of the United States. Controls on high-tech goods cost $9 billion annually and cause
significant loss in jobs and sales.); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(2) (Supp. HI 1985) (altering
the subject matter of national security controls, freeing some exports on the lower end of
technology and relaxing those exports to CoCom countries); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(0(1)
(1982) (broadening the foreign availability exception); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m)(2)(A)
(Supp. Il 1985) (The contract sanctity provision, generally prohibiting retroactive controls
on foreign policy grounds.); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (b)(1)(C) (The President can only
impose foreign policy controls if he makes determination that reactions of other countries
to such is not likely to render controls ineffective or counterproductive.).
110. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1).
111. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1992) ('Person or Firm, an individual, corporation, partnership,
association, company, or any other kind of organization, situated, residing, or doing
business in the United States, or any foreign country, including any government or agency
thereof, as well as a citizen or national of the United States or any foreign country.").
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exports and re-exports of foreign origin goods that are products of United
States-origin technology.112 With these regulations the United States has
attempted to prevent diversions of the EAA by extending its jurisdiction
to cover persons and goods beyond its borders. While such extraterritorial
provisions have been subject to much controversy and protest among
foreign states, there seems to have been no significant concern by the
President or Congress."
3
Penalties are imposed for violators of the EAA. Although persons
who knowingly violate the EAA are technically subject to substantial fines
and possible imprisonment,'14 the United States generally imposes a non-
judicial measure; an alleged violator is placed on a denial list and cannot
export from the United States for a given time period." 5 The propriety
of non-judicial sanctions has also been called into question by foreign
nations who vehemently oppose attempts by the United States to control
trade within their borders and who view such measures as a further
violation of their sovereign integrity. While such sanctions may or may
not be a valid exercise of territorial sovereignty under international legal
principles, their effects have caused considerable animosity and have even
lead to countermanding orders by some states.!
1 6
2. The EAA and Chemical Weapons
The United States has imposed the framework of the EAA in an effort
to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons capacity to certain nations.
Pursuant to such, the Department of Commerce administers non-prolifera-
tion controls of dual-use chemicals, or precursors, that are useful in
manufacturing chemical munitions. These controls are maintained under
the foreign policy provisions of section 5 and are implemented by the
112. 15 C.F.R. §§ 774.1-774.90, 776.12, 779.8 (1992).
113. See discussion infra part V.A.
114. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (imposing either a $50,000 fine or five years
imprisonment); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1)(A) (imposing either a $1 million fine or 10
years imprisonment for exporting to a controlled country); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1).
115. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(i)(2)(A); 50 Fed. Reg. 10,756 (1991) (to be codified as 15
C.F.R. pts. 776-799) ("Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, directs the
Secretary of Commerce to exercise his authority under Executive Order No. 12730 to
control exports [of chemical and biological weapons that] ... would assist a country in
acquiring the capacity to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver or use [such weaponry].").
116. See discussion infra part V.A. (concerning the Siberian Pipeline controversy; In
re Dresser (France); and the case of Fruehauf-France concerning sales of tractor trailer
parts by a United States subsidiary to China).
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Department of Commerce through an elaborate licensing scheme and
through regulations promulgated and published in the Federal Register.
l 7
In 1991, and as a direct result of the Persian Gulf conflict with Iraq,
the President ordered the Department of Commerce to expand its controls
on precursors."' The Interim Rules, which became effective March
1991, reflect the Executive's policy, as set forth in the Enhanced Prolifera-
tion Control Initiative ("EPCI"), to use export controls to counter chemical
arms proliferation." 9 Specifically, the EPCI mandated worldwide export
controls on fifty precursors. Formerly such controls were in place for only
eleven precursor agents. The President is required under the EPCI to work
in conjunction with other nations to achieve this measure of greater
control.120 Additionally, the Commodity Control List ("CCL") was
amended to expand the number of countries for which a validated license
is required for the production of thirty-nine of these fifty precursors.1
2 '
A license is now mandatory to export precursors, under CCL No. ECCN
4798B, to all nations except NATO members and Australia Group
members.m
117. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. I 1992) (prohibited destinations Group 7 countries); 15
C.F.R. § 776.19 (1992) (Controls Chemical and Biological Agents); 15 C.F.R. §§ 799.1-
799.2 (1992) ("Commodity Control List"); The Department of Commerce maintains a
Commodity Control List for all commodities subject to its licensing control. Under its
regulations there are 2 license categories: 15 C.F.R. § 771 (1992) (contains the first
category: "General Licenses"); 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1992) (contains the other category:
"Validated Licenses"); 15 C.F.R. § 773 (1992) (describes the "Special Licensing
Procedures"); 15 C.F.R. § 772.4 (1992) (provides that in application for export, an exporter
must fill out form BXA-622P); 15 C.F.R. § 772.3(a) (1992) (requires that an exporter must
fully disclose all); 15 C.F.R. § 772.3(b) (1992) (provisions relating to consignees and the
ultimate end-users).
118. Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls on Chemical Weapon Precursors, 56 Fed.
Reg. 10,756 (1991) (to be codified as 15 C.F.R. pts. 776-799) ("Executive Order No.
12735 November 16, 1990, directs the Secretary of Commerce to exercise his authority
under Executive Order No. 12730 to control exports [of chemical and biological weapons
that] ... would assist a country in acquiring the capacity to develop, produce, stockpile,
deliver or use [such weaponry].").
119. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756 (1991) (to be codified as 15 C.F.R. pts. 776-799).
120. All 50 precursors have been identified by the Australia Group. See discussion
infra notes 202-03.
121. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1 1991) (replacing ECCN 5798F with ECCN 4798B,
which is now the Export Control Commodity Number for all 50 precursor agents).
122. 115 C.F.R. § 785 (1991). Previously these precursors required a validated license
for export only to those countries listed in the statute as Country S (Libya, Iran, Iraq,
Syria) and Country Z (Cuba, Cambodia, N. Korea, Vietnam). Export of goods under
ECCN 4798B will generally be denied to Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Id.
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To prevent precursor diversions to unauthorized countries by either
United States nationals or foreign persons, the Department of Commerce
has now placed ECCN 4798B under the prohibitive re-export regime, and
has included controls on materials (precursors) used in foreign-made
products that would be detrimental to United States security.123 As with
the EAA, transactions and items pursuant to ECCN 4798B are subject to
the same sanctions and willful violations under the EAA.'24
B. Strengthening the Export Administration Ace: The Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
Although Congress has disagreed frequently with the Executive on the
scope of restrictions under the EAA, such is not the case with controls on
chemical weapons capabilities. Rather, apprehensive of the danger of
continued proliferation to rogue nations like Iraq," 5 the Congress has
fashioned its own response: it has enacted even more far-reaching
jurisdiction than had previously existed under the EAA regulations."n
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 ("1991 Act") amended the EAA with additional and more
stringent unilateral measures. '27 The Secretary of Commerce is mandated
to establish a list'"' of goods and technology that require a validated
license to any 'country of concern"2 9 if such items directly and substan-
tially assist a foreign government or group in acquiring the capability to
123. 15 C.F.R. § 776.12 (1992). Special commodity policies and provisions apply parts
and component provisions to all items controlled under ECCN 4798B.
124. 15 C.F.R. § 776.19. The Interim Rules leave in place the contract sanctity
provisions, which exclude transactions before a date certain from the retroactive effects of
the new regulations, although the Department of Commerce is seriously considering
denying this savings provision under the final amended regulations. Id.
125. See supra notes 35, 37.
126. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
127. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1245-1258 (codified as amended in sections of 22
U.S.C. §§ 5601-5606 & 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2410).
128. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m) (1993).
129. Id. § 2405(m)(3)(A)-(B).
A country of concern is a country other than (1) a country whose government
the United States has entered into bilateral or multilateral arrangement for the
control of goods or technology on the Established List; and (2) such other
countries .. .designated consistent with the purposes of the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
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develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical and biological weap-
ons.130 United States sanctions apply after a presidential determination
is made that a foreign person13' has contributed materially to the chemi-
cal weapons capability of a foreign country in part through exporting from
any other country any goods or technology that would be, if they were
United States goods, subject to United States jurisdiction.132 Here, the
1991 Act goes well beyond the re-export provisions that previously
existed in the EAA regulations, which are suspect under international law,
and asserts even more draconian jurisdiction by claiming to encompass
secondary transactions that involve neither United States goods, United
States technology, nor United States nationals. Tough additional sanctions
bar foreign violators 33 from United States government procurement
contracts and prohibit them from importing into the United States for at
least a twelve month period."
V. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT Do IT ALONE
A. Legal Problems: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
1. Trouble behind
Not only does America's unilateral approach fail to solve the problems
of controlling worldwide chemical weapons capability and dual-use
precursors, it creates substantial legal problems as well. Indeed, the
approach may have the unwelcome effect of alienating potential allies to
the cause. United States domestic export controls, including the EAA,
130. Id. § 2405(m)(1).
131. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410c(f) (1993).
A foreign person is defined as (1) an individual who is not a citizen of the
United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or (2) a corporation, partnership, or other entity which is created or organized
under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business
outside the United States.
Id
132. Id. § 2410c(a)(1)(B).
133. Id. § 2410c(a)(3). "For purposes of sanctions, foreign person also includes (1) any
successor entity; (2) any foreign person that is a parent or subsidiary of that foreign person
if the parent or subsidiary knowingly assisted in the activities; and (3) any affiliate of a
foreign person that knowingly assisted in the activities." Id
134. Id. § 2410c(c), (d).
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have been deemed constitutional despite the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of domestic law. 35 But whether or not export
controls are valid under the Constitution makes no difference under
international law, because under that framework all domestic laws are
subordinate and have no legal effect. 3 Yet under the EAA and through
implementing regulations, the Congress and Executive have deliberately
asserted jurisdiction over persons and transactions beyond the territorial
borders of the United States 37 The United States objective is clear: to
stop diversion of United States goods and technology that could contribute
to lethal chemical munitions capability. However well-meaning this
objective may be, what are the bases in international law to regulate goods
and conduct beyond United States borders, and can United States law be
reconciled under these international norms?
Under international law, extraterritoriality, or the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over activities occurring outside a state's territorial borders, is
considered a valid exercise of state power in appropriate circumstanc-
es. 131 In a given circumstance, however, what is deemed an appropriate
extraterritorial claim must be examined within the context of the larger
international order. A most fundamental precept of international law is that
it is derived from the consensus of individual nation states; 139 once
135. So long as Congress has intended the law to apply beyond its borders, the court
must find such law constitutional, regardless of whether it violates international law. See
Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967); see Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 755
F.2d 544 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907 (1985) (An act of Congress should never
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction exists.); see
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1177-78 (E.D. Pa.
1980); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
136. See RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(1)(b) (1986).
137. 15 C.F.R. §§ 774.1-774.90, 776.12, 779.8 (1992); see Robert Thompson, United
States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects,
15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319, 347 (1983) (With the 1979 amendments to the EAA,
the Congress specifically rejected a proposal to alter nonemergency power under EAA to
apply extraterritorial controls over foreign subsidiaries. Though the Congress recognized
that such claims would likely be challenged, it was persuaded that the executive should
have flexibility in carrying out export controls for foreign policy purposes.).
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1986) (International
law recognizes limitations on the authority of states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
to prescribe in circumstances effecting the interests of other states.).
139. See discussion supra part Ill.D.; see generally J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 5 (1963) (The modem nation-state was recognized after the Peace of West-
phalia.); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (With the emergence of the modem nation-
state came the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty and the right to exercise
jurisdiction over all persons within your borders; nonintervention is the fundamental
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recognized widely by states over time it becomes binding on all nations.
Within this construct, the traditional view is that the legitimacy of
international rules are derived from the states; the states collectively are the
repository of power and authority and can only be bound to the extent that
they are willing to relinquish their sovereign power. Under the rationale
of Lotus, all jurisdictional assertions are presumed lawful unless it can be
shown that the state has consented to relinquishing power in a particular
area. " Therefore, international order is essentially horizontal. There is
no higher authority, but rather the struggle among sovereigns tends to
balance out power, thus creating some order among nations. 41 But a
legal order that equates jurisdiction in terms of power is one that must
necessarily be conflict-creating, as relative power imbalances will always
be a part of the natural political order.
The international legal order can also be examined from a more
modem perspective, where the international legal structure has legitimacy
independent of the individual states that created it. Hence, the authority of
a state to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction depends not only on the nature
and reasonableness of its claim but also on how the action affects the
interests of other states. 4 2  Or put another way, the legal order as a
whole must be by-and-large effective to be legitimate; states must act on
the assumption that the legal order is effective or there is no order. 43
In contrast to the more traditional power based view, here the international
order is sufficiently endowed with authority to allow its validity despite
dissidence.' " As such, the sovereign power of any one state is con-
principle of protecting and reinforcing the sovereignty of nations.). See Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) ("Jurisdiction of a nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute... ."). The world may be witnessing a
certain giving way of the principle of nonintervention so grounded in territorial sovereignty
to a new international minimum standard. The United States and the United Nations
intervened without military action in Iraq to prevent mass starvation and possible genocide
of over 1,000,000 Kurds fleeing Iraq after civil disruption following the Gulf War of 1991.
140. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 150 (Sept. 7)
(holding that an exercise of jurisdiction must be presumed lawful unless an affirmative
international rule forbidding such exercise exists).
141. See Nicholas G. Onuf, International Legal Order as an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT'L L.
244 (1979).
142. See HENKIN, supra note 90.
143. See Onuf, supra note 141, at 254.
144. Idl at 257-58 (arguing that since the United Nations Charter of 1945, the
international order has become more functional in nature; new expressions of the collective
will are transformed into law with more immediacy as opposed to previous traditional law
making, which was generated over long periods of custom and practice by states).
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strained to the extent that international law has circumscribed rules in a
given area."4 Further, such a system has the attraction of predictability,
a key to international stability and harmony. Ultimately, an international
order based upon some degree of higher authority is more likely to be fair
and less conflict-creating than one in which jurisdiction is grounded on the
capacity to coerce, which seems bound to generate expansive jurisdictional
claims.
1 46
It is important that others in the international community consider the
United States' jurisdictional reaches appropriate and within the bounds of
international norms. If other nations perceive our domestic policy to be
unfairly disadvantaging their citizens and to proceed from power not
principle, they will act to protect their interests-perhaps by resisting
enforcement efforts or by retaliating with counter-measures of their own.
The United States cannot rely upon a legitimate interest alone to justify
unilateral actions that interfere with the territorial sovereignty of others.
Even assuming that the United States has firm ground to base extraterrito-
rial claims, limitations are placed upon the jurisdiction to prescribe.
Section 403 of the Restatement sets forth factors to be considered in
determining when such an exercise is reasonable and hence appropriate.
This balancing of interests reflects a desire to foster consensual, rather than
power-based, assertions of jurisdiction."4
United States extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction over re-exports
of United States origin goods and technology have in fact already
generated serious controversy among nations that see such claims as
interference with their trade and an affront to their sovereignty146
145. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1952) (noting that
this principle itself is a rule of international law).
146. Von Mehrn, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and
Evaluated, 63 B.U. L.REv. 279, 338 ("[A] legal order that views jurisdiction in terms of
[power] ... will simply want to ensure that its arsenal of jurisdictional bases are large and
varied.. . ."); see Onuf, supra note 141 (discussing the difficulty of turning the current
international legal order into a world order that is supported by independent authority).
147. RESTATEMENT ('HmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1986).
148. See Lorraine M. Cody, National Security Export Controls: Congress Adopts an
All for One and One for All Approach, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 588 (1988) (A necessary
attribute of sovereignty is a state's right to absolute control over its foreign trade.); see
supra note 100. There are substantial parts of the EAA controls that present no inherent
conflict: The United States has the right under international law to prescribe jurisdiction
as to any nationals or persons within its borders who knowingly export from the United
States any chemical agents or munitions to any prohibited destination; moreover, the
United States has legitimate power over transactions undertaken by its nationals who are
beyond United States borders and violate United States export controls in this area. See
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Almost every United States attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction
pursuant to export controls has created significant international friction.
149
One of the few instances in which such a conflict was subject to
judicial review was the Fruehauf case." There a United States corpora-
tion, which owned seventy percent of a foreign subsidiary in France,
entered into a contract with France's largest truck manufacturer to supply
tractor trailer parts to China. When the United States government tried to
prohibit this secondary transaction the French court ordered Fruehauf-Fr.
to perform on the contract, and the United States ultimately backed
down.151 The President's use of foreign policy controls under the EAA
to register disapproval of a Soviet-backed crackdown by Polish authorities
against the trade union, Solidarity, caused extreme protest by European
governments." The Siberian pipeline, a $25 billion project, was
discussion infra part V.A.2.
149. See V. Rock Gnindman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application
of United States Laws, 14 INT'L LAW. 257 (1980) (criticizing United States trade laws for
undermining the sovereignty of other nations because they interfere with their foreign and
domestic policies). See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 100, at 11-15 (arguing that clashes
among United States and European allies have promoted possibly the most strained
relations among them since World War 11). See generally Caldwell, supra note 107
(arguing that foreign nations have strenuously objected to United States extraterritorial
assertions, which have even lead to retaliatory legislation by some); see Joseph P. Griffin,
Possible Resolutions of International Disputes of U.S. Anti-Trust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 279, 279 n.1 (1983) (citing examples of foreign reactions); see R. Stebbing, Export
Controls: Extraterritorial Conflict, Dilemma of Host Country Employee, 19 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 303, 308-09 (1987) (Parliament enacted the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act of 1980, ostensibly to shield foreign subsidiaries of American companies
incorporated in Britain from extraterritorial reaches of United States jurisdiction.).
150. Fruehauf v. Massardy [1968] D.S. Jur. 147 [1965] J.C.P. 11 14274 bis (Cours
d'appel, Paris) (The United States had broad regulations under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, which purported to control foreign subsidiaries of United States parents, and
prohibited trade with China.). See also Stanley J. Marcus & Eric L. Richard, Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20
COLUM. J. tANSNAT'L. L. 439, 466-67 (1981) (American attempts to control foreign
subsidiaries have sometimes met diplomatic rather than judicial responses.).
151. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLmCAL ENDS, ch.1, § 3 (1977) (for a detailed analysis of the Fruehauf
incident).
152. See Thompson, supra note 137, at 355; Common Market Challenges U.S. Policies
on Trade as Economic Relations Worsen, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1982, at 4 (Europeans
contended that United States action violated international law.). See A.V. Lowe, Public
International Law and Conflicts of Laws: European Response to U.S. EAA Regulations,
33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 515, 897 (1984) (The European Community's principal objection
was that the extraterritorial reach of the United States violated international law.).
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designed to transport Soviet natural gas from Siberian wells to Western
European markets. The project needed certain western technologies that
were to be manufactured in Europe by domestic firms under differing
arrangements with specific United States sources. In 1982, the United
States banned all re-exports of oil and gas equipment utilizing United
States goods or technology from third countries to the USSR and banned
foreign subsidiaries of United States companies from engaging in similar
transactions.'" To protect their trading interests many European govern-
ments issued opposing orders, directed at all companies within their
territory, to fulfill contracts signed prior to the effective date of EAA
regulations."s When actual goods were shipped by foreign subsidiaries of
United States companies, the United States imposed sanctions by way of
the Denial List. ' Dresser, who had a French subsidiary caught in the
crossfire, challenged the action in federal court, but the President lifted
sanctions before a ruling was made.'"
These incidents demonstrate that United States reliance on a power-
oriented basis for asserting jurisdiction beyond its borders can create
serious conflict. As the world becomes more interdependent and as trade
becomes increasingly necessary for United States economic stability, the
United States must be mindful of the consequences of its extraterritorial
reaching-especially when that reaching involves dual-use goods that have
legitimate non-military uses. Also, with the growth of foreign direct
investment in the United States, the proverbial tables could be turned.
Now the United States must play its relatively new role as a host state. In
the past, the United States has reacted forcefully to any attempts by other
nations to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over United States nationals and
corporations. Therefore, it will be difficult to convince others that they
should bend to our will while we have vehemently opposed similar
reachings.'
57
153. Thompson, supra note 137, at 354-55.
154. Id. at 356 (Several European nations had a large number of contracts relating to
the Soviet pipeline using technology licensed from United States firms, some of whom
were subsidiaries of United States companies.).
155. See discussion supra part IV.
156. Thompson, supra note 137, at 356 nn.173-174 (The President stated that a more
united and cohesive Allied policy towards the Soviets had been formulated, thus obviating
the need for United States re-export controls, but most categorized this as a face-saving
means to end unpopular sanctions. Dresser argued that extraterritorial approach was
contrary to principles of international law.). See In re Dresser (France); Dresser Industries
v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
157. See LoWENFELD, supra note 100 (for a discussion of United States regulations
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2. Trouble Ahead
Both in current law and in pending legislation the EAA and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder are extremely broad assertions of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. 58 What bases under international law might justify
such claims?
a. The Territoriality Principle
Territoriality is a fundamental power emanating from sovereignty. A
sovereign state has jurisdiction to prescribe behavior for conduct occurring
entirely or substantially within its borders and for the interests in property
and the status of persons within its territory. 9 Additionally, it may have
jurisdiction to prescribe conduct outside its borders but only if such
conduct has a substantial effect within its borders and only if reason-
able.'" It follows then that a state has an absolute right to control its
trade, and as such the provisions of the EAA, which purport to control
persons within United States territory from exporting certain chemical
precursors to certain destinations, are entirely proper. The propriety of
nonjudicial sanctions by the United States is less clear." m The United
States can reasonably argue that it is not in fact prescribing behavior for
actions committed beyond its borders; rather it is merely denying United
States exporters the privilege of selling to any person who has violated the
EAA regulations on chemical precursors by actions that occur beyond
United States borders. The same rationale applies when the United States
denies, by way of the Denial List, access into the United States market to
a person, who by acts committed outside the United States territory, has
violated EAA provisions in this area. Yet it seems the more forceful
argument that such sanctions, when applied to actions of persons and over
blocking the effect of Arab boycott of Israel).
158. If a foreign importer outside United States territory re-exports goods that originated
in the United States without permission of the United States government, then that importer
is violating United States law. If the importer diverts re-export goods to an unauthorized
end-user, even within his own country, or if he makes an unauthorized export of goods
manufactured in his own country by use of American goods, he is also in violation. This
is true even if transactions conform with both the law and policy of the importer's country.
159. See REsTATE mENT (Mr1raf) OiF FOREIGN REATioNs I 402(l)(a)(b) (1986).
160. Id. § 402(1)(c). This is sometimes referred to as the Effects Doctrine-wherein
a state may assert jurisdiction over activities beyond its borders if such activity has a
substantial effect within its territory.
161. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
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goods solely within another sovereign's territory and entirely legal under
that nation's domestic law, do interfere with the internal commerce of that
nation. In fact, it is legitimate to raise as a defense the effects doctrine to
assert that such United States actions have a substantial and negative effect
on the internal affairs of other nations. One need only imagine the
situation in reverse to comprehend the merit of the assertion and the depth
of hostility to such perceived overreaching. 62
b. The Nationality Principle
The United States has claimed that property exported from the United
States possesses United States nationality; the EAA specifically speaks of
goods or property subject to its jurisdiction. Hence, with respect to goods
either produced in the United States or abroad using United States material,
components, or know-how, the United States deems that nationality follows
those goods, just as nationality follows an individual. From a legal
standpoint this is a tenuous argument because it is counter to well-
established principles of property law that declare title to property vests
upon delivery when control is relinquished.'63 Additionally, under
United States tax law, where the goods come to rest determines their
nationality for tax purposes.1" In the fast-paced environment of massive
transborder transfer of goods and technology, such an implausible theory
makes little practical or legal sense and has garnered no acceptance beyond
the United States!'
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402, cmt. d (1986) ("Contro-
versy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the U.S. and others, particularly
through competition laws, on the basis of economic effect in their territory when conduct
was lawful where carried out."); see infra note 174.
163. See L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
(explaining that the nationality principle is not traditionally applied to property other than
vessels and airplanes, with a possible exception for distinct cultural property); see Thomas
G. Harris, A British Perspective on Export Controls, in TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROL,
COMPETITION AND NATIONAL SEcURITY: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS 123-24 (Bernard L.
Seward, Sr. ed., 1985) (stating that attempts to control goods once they have entered
another country are considered to be intrusive on sovereignty and amount to a challenge
to validity of title to property).
164. See Kenneth W. Abort, Extraterritorial Reach of Export Controls, 17 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 79, 135 (1984).
165. But see Marcus & Richard. supra note 150, at 480-81 (arguing that the UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illegal Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property lends some support to the position of the
United States).
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International law recognizes a state's right to regulate the conduct of
its nationals beyond its territory. The principal of nationality rests upon a
sovereign's right to demand allegiance in return for the protection it affords
its nationals both within and beyond its borders.'" With regard to the
EAA provisions that curtail or prohibit United States nationals from trading
in certain identified chemical precursors to certain destinations, such
prescription on behavior is entirely appropriate under international law.
The difficulty is in determining the nationality of a corporation, especially
a multinational enterprise ("MNE"). Historically, determining the
nationality of corporations has been the subject of debate and has generated
significant jurisdictional clashes and competing claims. 67 Under interna-
tional law a corporation is a juridical person and generally has the
nationality of the state of incorporation.'" This is especially important
because when a state asserts jurisdiction based upon nationality over a
foreign person or subsidiary, it may subject its nationals to rules that
directly conflict with those of the host-state, thereby creating an inherent
conflict. In this position such 'nationals' are forced to choose between
incurring a penalty or liability under the law of either state. When
jurisdictional claims revolve around more internal matters, as here with the
EAA attempting to regulate trade in a host state, it appears the more
legitimate authority resides within the host state.' Since the EAA
attempts to regulate the conduct of foreign persons, corporations and
subsidiaries, the nationality principle would seem to offer no basis for
prescribing jurisdiction over foreign persons or corporations and little basis
for such over foreign subsidiaries unless the United States can come under
some established exception.
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(2) (1986); see also
Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (United States national subject to United States
subpoena while abroad.).
167. Some states view the place of incorporation as controlling, whereas others look to
the state where the seat or chief office (siege social) is located, and still others look to
factors such as where most of the corporation's activity takes place. See I. BROwNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 422-23 (3d ed. 1979).
168. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5) (holding that the place of incorporation will most likely determine nationality, but
not absolutely). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213 (1986). Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 n.11 (1982) (court used place of
incorporation to determine nationality). But states are always free to alter this principle
by treaty and have done so in limited circumstances (e.g., International Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 25, 17 U.N.T.S. 159).
169. See Thompson, supra note 137, at 377 (Typically internal matters such as labor,
health and safety regulations, tax laws, etc., are governed by the host state jurisdiction.).
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The Restatement Third sets forth certain limited instances in which it
is acceptable under international rules for a state to prescribe conduct
regarding activities of a foreign subsidiary.' 0 It also recognizes that
foreign subsidiaries are often part of a larger entity, the MNE, which is a
distinctly unique enterprise now prominent in the international community.
As trade undergoes further globalization, a precise means of determining
nationality for MNEs will become increasingly blurred and difficult to
ascertain. Generally, section 213 will be applicable but with a necessary
realization that corporate nationality is "peculiarly subject to manipula-
tion,""" and does not lend itself to neat jurisdictional categories."
Thus, a state may refuse to treat a corporation as a national of the state of
incorporation where there are insufficient genuine links.'"
Section 414 of the Restatement (Third) establishes certain exceptional
circumstances that will allow a state to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
subsidiary: (1) the regulation must be essential to further a major national
interest; (2) such can only be carried out effectively overall if it is also
applied to the foreign subsidiary; and (3) such regulation is conflicting with
the law or policy of the host state.'7 4  While reasonable minds would
hardly differ over the goal of eliminating chemical weapons proliferation,
reasonable minds may hardly agree as the means necessary to the task.
One of the core problems is that chemical precursors can have legitimate,
even life-saving uses. So, who decides whether or when such goods can
be shipped to a given destination? Further, although it is true that United
States policy will be effectively thwarted if re-export provisions are not
applied to foreign subsidiaries, the practical reality is that even if applied
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 1 414 (1986) (A state may not
ordinarily regulate activities of foreign corporations on the basis that they are owned or
controlled by nationals of the regulating state, but a corporation cannot escape or evade all
regulation by the state of the parent company merely by setting up foreign subsidiaries.).
171. Id § 213.
172. There are commentators who argue that the multinational corporation is so
powerful and influential in international economic terms, that it is in fact breaking down
traditional notions of territorial sovereignty. See Jonathan Turley, MNE Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. L. REV. & Bus. 598, 663 (1990)
(calling for multilateral regulation of MNEs, as territorial/nationality bases for jurisdiction
are now becoming obsolete and inadequate).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213 cmt. c (1986). "[A] state
is entitled to reject representation by the incorporation state if it was chosen solely for legal
convenience, for example, as a tax haven, and the corporation has no substantial links with
that state, such as property, and office or ... substantial business activity, or residence of
substantial shareholders.").
174. I § 412(2)(b)(i)-(iii).
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effectively by foreign subsidiaries of MNEs such unilateral measures
standing alone will never adequately stop proliferation worldwide,
regardless of the laws or policy of the host state.' Moreover, the most
fundamental problem is the United States' attempts to usurp an essential
aspect of sovereignty: a state's right to set and regulate its trade policy.
Thus, at a most basic level, United States regulation of secondary
transshipments will necessarily be perceived as a direct affront to another
nation's sovereignty with the inherent potential for jurisdictional conflict.
In such circumstances, there is little doubt that the United States has a
rather weak basis for its extraterritorial assertions under international law.
Apparently, the United States recognizes this legal problem, at least
to some extent. 7 6 To circumvent the extraterritorial assertions within the
framework of the EAA, the United States utilizes contractual mechanisms
to establish jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries and corporations. So-
called submission agreements purport to bind foreign purchasers by
mandating that they give written assurances to abide by United States
export laws and not re-export in violation thereof. Under this theory
foreign entities are deemed to have voluntarily submitted to United States
jurisdiction, as no one is forced to conduct business with the United States.
Generally there is no principle of international law that prevents a nation
from directing its export trade as it sees fit, rather, such is an inherent right
of sovereignty. But under the circumstances, if particular goods are not
readily available outside the United States, then an implicit agreement to
observe end-use and re-export rules becomes more likely an adhesion
contract, a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.'" Indisputably, the United
States has the right to refrain from direct trade with individual countries for
purposes of effectuating its policy of preventing chemical precursor
proliferation. However, its attempt to prohibit foreign business in foreign
countries from such trade seems a rather blatant interference with the
political and economic independence of foreign states."' Moreover, any
175. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 150, at 439-40 (1981) (arguing that United
States trade laws exceed limits of jurisdiction established under international law and that
the nationality principle as construed in Barcelona Traction does not justify assertion of
United States jurisdiction over every foreign subsidiary, especially when laws interfere with
the foreign policy interests, balance of payments, and economic policies of other countries).
176. See discussion supra part IV.
177. To the extent that dual-use chemicals are controlled by the United States and the
Australia Group, it follows that such availability will be restricted on the global market to
some extent.
178. But see Marcus & Richard, supra 150, at 480 (arguing that if the re-export of
goods or technology would have substantial undesirable effects within United States
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agreement between the United States government and a foreign national in
no way binds the sovereign of that national-for in no way has it
relinquished its sovereign right to control its trade, its nationals, or its
economic destiny. Rather, as the Fruehauf and Dresser incidents illustrate,
attempts by the United States to reach into another sovereign's territory and
regulate trade must necessarily violate the public policy of that foreign
nation.
c. The Protective Principle
The Protective Principle is a much more circumscribed basis to assert
jurisdiction in international law. ' It recognizes a state's right to assert
jurisdiction extraterritorially over offenses directed against its national
security. While the scope of conduct that may threaten the security of a
state is ill-defined, it is generally required that such conduct must be of a
nature generally recognized as a crime by states with relatively well-
developed legal systems." As such, it seems an attenuated argument to
claim that secondary transactions in chemical precursors are a real threat
to the national security of the United States. Possibly, if there was a
massive quantity being transhipped to a third country with questionable
motives and capabilities, then that particular transaction could conceivably
be a real threat; however, it cannot justify a blanket claim of jurisdiction.
Rather, the protective principle is basically a shield that allows the state
exercising jurisdiction to avoid a substantial and legitimate threat to its
very sovereignty and can not be invoked to avoid merely a threat to a
public policy objective."'
territory, then assertion of jurisdiction is possible, based on the effects doctrine). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (c), cmt. d (1986). Although in this
instance one is hard-pressed to establish that re-export of chemical precursors standing
alone would have substantial, undesirable effects upon United States territory. Even the
re-export of actual lethal chemical agents or hardware may be insufficient to establish
legitimacy of jurisdictional prescriptions under the Effects Doctrine. For example, how
does the existence of Libya's alleged chemical weapons plant at Rabta substantially effect
activities within United States territory. See supra note 61.
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(3) (1986).
180. Id cmt. f. Examples of generally recognized crimes are: espionage, counterfeit-
ing, and falsification of official documents. See also H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary
Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 106-07
(1928) ("[A] state is entitled to expect that the exclusiveness of other states' jurisdiction
over their territory will not result... in a serious menace to its existence and safety...
[that] constitutes, according to an almost unanimous consensus of opinion, a perfectly good
ground for intervention.").
181. Extraterritorial assertions based upon the protective principle have been little used
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d. The Universality Principle
The Universality Principle is another limited basis for extraterritorial
assertion. It permits states to define and punish certain offenses that they
would otherwise have no jurisdiction over if the offense is readily
acknowledged by the international community to be against a core interest
of all nations. 2 Universal jurisdiction results, then, from a universal
condemnation as reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and
resolutions by international organizations, such as the United Nations.1
3
Applied to the actual use of lethal chemical warfare in present times, such
jurisdiction could well be appropriate" but as to secondary transactions
of precursors there is no valid basis to assert jurisdiction under such
principle.'8 5
It seems evident that the United States re-export regime is neither
legitimate nor reasonable under accepted international legal principles.
Indeed, in all likelihood such grandiose extraterritorial claims will continue
to bring more harm than good. Enforcement is also a consideration.
Whereas the EAA provides for severe criminal and civil penalties for
willful violations, the United States relies instead on non-judicial measures
to induce foreign importers to tow the party line. Rather than concern
itself with sticky problems of obtaining in personan jurisdiction over
foreign parties, the United States can simply put the alleged offender on
the Denial List, effectively cutting off its access to United States goods and
technology.'" As previously stated, by purporting to be only asserting
jurisdiction for behavior within its territory, the United States may resolve
the legality of such means under international law. Yet, since the United
by states and typically have involved threats of a more direct nature. See United States
v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1986). Some examples of
crimes of universal concern are piracy, genocide, slave trade, and war crimes.
183. Id cmt. a.
184. See discussion supra part Ill. Had Iraq used chemical weapons against Allied
forces in the Persian Gulf War, a very real possibility existed that United Nations would
have not only condemned Iraq but would have taken action to punish Iraqi leadership for
war crimes.
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1986) (This allows for
instances when two states have legitimate or concurrent jurisdiction that each will fully
evaluate before exercising such jurisdiction and is based on notions of comity among
nations. Thus, if a state claims certain chemical agents are necessary to develop its
industrial/medical base, how can the United States claim its extraterritorial jurisdiction
should supersede another sovereign's domestic economic integrity.).
186. Id § 423(3)(C)(A)-(B).
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States remains the largest, most lucrative consumer market in the world,
wielding such heavy economic clout will not likely enamor others to our
cause. Lastly, foreign nationals and their respective governments can never
be entirely certain that the United States will not impose import sanctions
whenever it perceives that a transaction beyond its territory will imperil
national security.'87 Such overt assertions based upon power alone will
do little good to long-term political and economic interests of the United
States because they will be perceived as neither fair nor predictable. More
importantly, the world can ill-afford to become tangled-up in power politics
while chemical weapons capabilities spread. Surely the war in the Gulf
has shown us that a determined and united effort is needed.
B. Practical Problems: The Global Chemical Industry and the MNE
Unilateral export controls under the current statutory scheme are and
will remain ultimately unsatisfactory in preventing the development and
proliferation of chemical agents that can be used to manufacture chemical
weapons. As previously noted, there is the particularly thorny problem of
the extraterritorial reach of such unilateral measures, which are problematic
at best. The most obvious practical reality is that the United States cannot
achieve this objective in a vacuum. The nature of the chemical industry
and of dual-use chemical agents is now too diverse and dispersed
throughout the industrial world.'" Although the international chemical
market is still dominated by only a few large fimns, there are at least
twenty countries that have highly sophisticated chemical industries.
Therefore, even if the United States can control effectively all present and
187. By adopting 50 U.S.C. § 2443 (1988), specific sanctions were imposed by
Congress through amendments to the EAA against two foreign firms: (1) Konsberg, a
Norwegian firm, for selling advanced milling machines to the Soviet Union that gave the
Soviets the ability to produce silent propeller blades for their submarine fleet, and (2)
Toshiba, a Japanese firm, for selling the Soviets computers that provided their control.
Both companies were not allowed to trade with the United States government, nor import
products into United States markets from December 1988 to December 1991 (even though
neither the products nor technology were of United States origin nor contained United
States components, and even though these transactions were not violations of United States
law). The so-called Toshiba incident provoked much resentment by United States allies
that such unilateral United States actions could produce serious financial harm to western
economies; high tensions led to a senior political meeting in January 1988 of CoCom
members (which include NATO nations, plus Japan and Iceland). See 4 GLOB. AFP. 121-
22 (1989). See generally Jere W. Morehead, Controlling Diversion: How can we Convert
the Toshiba-Konsberg Controversy into a Victory for the West?, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
277 (1988-89).
188. See discussion supra part ff.
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future United States trade in precursors, it cannot mandate to a foreign
power how that government should control its export trade in this area.'89
Further, there is the nature of the global chemical market itself. In the
last ten to fifteen years there has been a tremendous internationalization of
189. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 142 (he largest firms are based in the United
States, Britain, France, Japan, and West Germany.). Even when foreign governments are
in relative harmony with United States export controls on chemical agents, if foreign
governments are lax about enforcement there is no international legal regime that the
United States or the international community can turn to for sanctions if in fact private
sources clandestinely sell chemical agents to other, third-party nations. See Germany;
Make Arms, Not War, ECONOlwsT, Feb. 16, 1991, at 76-77 (alleging tacit agreement
between German industry and government whereby Germany's tough export controls on
chemical agents and chemical precursors would not get in the way of export trade, and
finding that over 60 German firms helped to assemble Iraq's chemical weapons capacity.
To avoid suspicion, such facilities were described as civilian pesticide plants, but authors
quote chemists and engineers who say it was clear from an early stage what was really
going on in Iraq); see supra note 61 (Germany helps build chemical plant clandestinely for
Libya).
In the United States, serious allegations are being investigated that during the 1980s,
the policy of the Department of Commerce was to aggressively push the export of dual-use
technological hardware to Iraq, and warnings by the Department of Defense and the United
States Customs Service were ignored regarding the probability that such exports were being
adapted by Iraq for chemical and biological weaponry, as well as for missile technology.
Thus, it was impossible to get United States allies to agree not to export dual-use goods
to Iraq since the United States, through the Department of Commerce, was granting
licenses for just that; it was not stopped until a 1987 agreement among some industrial
nations to halt exporting to Iraq (and other less developed countries) missile and chemical
weapons technology. Expose: Nightline (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 17, 1991).
Throughout the 1980s, Iraq illegally utilized approximately $2 billion worth of United
States financed agricultural credits to acquire high technology to build up its military,
including chemical weapons. This money was funneled through a Georgia bank, which
was a branch of an Italian bank, Banco Nazionale del Lavoro. Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, May 1, 1991); see Military Sale to Iraq Backed by U.S. Credit, Hill Told,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1991, at A17 (A Federal grand jury indicted the Atlanta branch of
the Italian bank, Banco Nazionale del Lavoro ("BNL") and Iraqi officials in March 1991
for (1) conspiring to defraud the Italian Bank in connection with $4 billion in loans, $800
million of which were guaranteed by the Department of Agriculture; (2) using bank pledges
from BNL Atlanta that were backed by United States farm loan guaranteed by the
Department of Agriculture; (3) using bank pledges from BNL Atlanta that were backed by
United States farm loan guarantees, a Pennsylvania company, Kennametal, Inc., which sold
machine tools to Iraq for military purposes in 1989. A Kennametal spokesperson indicated
all sales to Iraq occurred in 1989 at which time the Bush administration was encouraging
United States companies to trade with Iraq. The spokesperson further indicated that the
company did not know that United States agricultural credits were being used to finance
the sales. Kennametal stated that it had not evaded United Export control laws because
the machine tools were made and shipped by its foreign subsidiary, thus United States
export licenses were not required.).
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chemical firms and related companies, resulting in huge transborder flows
of all kinds of chemicals, technology, and chemical know-how." Large
United States and European firms, hitherto rivals, are merging to gain
economies of scale needed to survive in this highly competitive global
environment." So as rapidly as technological advances develop, they
will be dispersed by the multinational enterprises that now dominate the
chemical industry.
Also the nature of the MNE itself has created unique problems and
thus far has defied a coherent international regime capable of any real
regulation or supervision." The growth of the MNE has coincided with
the growth of international trading and foreign direct investment generally.
It is defined as "enterprise[s] which are directed from ... countries of
origin (home state) and engage in economically significant activities within
other states, known as host countries.""c' There is still much debate on
how best to exert legal control over MNEs, with some favoring linkage of
foreign subsidiaries to their parent company, which controls decision
making-while others see territorial control by the host state as sacrosanct.
Therefore, from a practical standpoint it will often be difficult to ascertain,
at least for purposes of United States export law, who in fact has the
requisite knowledge to be identified as a violator and hence subject to
sanctions. 14
Lastly, unilateral controls on the United States chemical industry
produce an uneven burden because only United States companies will
absorb the damage to business relationships and to market share." As
a consequence, unilateral controls could also discourage United States
companies from entering new markets or expanding market position,
190. Koplow, supra note 50, at 264 (Affiliated companies are involved in a vast variety
of business transactions for development and marketing of chemical products. The flow
of information between parent and foreign subsidiaries, including flow of confidential trade
secrets, is an essential part of competitive trade in this industry.).
191. See Jack Welch Reinvents General Electric-Again, ECoNOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991,
at 59 (reporting that General Electric bought Borg-Warner Chemicals).
192. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for
Transportational Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970) (discussing various approaches to
regulate the MNE).
193. HANS W. BAADE, THE LEGAL EFFEcTS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
194. See discussion supra part IV.
195. See HOMER E. MOYER & LINDA A. MABRY, EXPORT CONTROLS AS INSTRUMENTS
OF FOREIGN POLICY 142-156 (1988) (for a lengthy analysis of the economic cost to United
States businesses resulting from unilateral export controls).
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especially if they must be overly anxious of possible sanctions regarding
re-export of United States chemicals by foreign parties over whom they
have little or no legitimate control."g United States chemical companies
are also wary of unilateral controls, which have the potential to jeopardize
confidential information such as intellectual property, trade secrets, and
customer lists. Were such knowledge leaked, it would put them at a
significant disadvantage." It is precisely the industry's rapid ability to
produce and process new chemicals that maintain its global competitive-
ness. 19
It is evident that export controls will be exceedingly more effective if
applied multilaterally by all the major industrial players, because the
impact of such coordination will be far greater when all possible source
countries enforce them. From a political perspective, the United States
must forge a consensus if it truly hopes to contain precursor proliferation.
Now is not the time to antagonize other sovereigns through jurisdictional
overreaching or disproportionate sanctions that adversely impact upon their
trade with the United States. The United States must regard foreign
sovereigns with comity-a recognition that each sovereign is equal among
all nations-and work with them, not against them. To the extent the
world's chemical industry is concentrated in the MNEs, bridging alliances
will go far in alleviating worrisome extraterritorial issues that have arisen
when applying unilateral controls to MNEs.
From an economic perspective, it is essential for the United States to
maintain harmonious relations with allies and trading partners. As
international trade grows, so does the potential for the United States
economy. In 1990, the United States had an 8.5% growth in exports,
which accounted for eighty-eight percent of total economic growth.' 99
Clearly, United States export trade is too vital to risk disruption from ill-
fated attempts to control the global chemical market single-handedly.
Multilateral measures will also lessen the burden on United States business,
in particular chemical producers, who themselves are a highly productive
and important sector of the United States economy. Such measures also
best serve the stated congressional policy of protecting and enhancing
196. Koplow, supra note 50, at 58 (public statements of United States chemical
producers on the importance of avoiding unilateral United States trade restrictions which
could result in customers shifting their purchases to suppliers from other countries at the
competitive disadvantage of United States firms).
197. See 1 SIPRI, supra note 18, at 30.
198. See supra note 52.
199. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 33 (Chemical manufacturing plants account for 10%
of the total value-added in United States manufacturing.).
302 [Vol. 13
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
United States competitiveness abroad. Indeed, increased capital flow will
allow research and development efforts to expand into areas such as
pharmaceuticals, with potential to benefit all humankind. Thus, from a
political, legal, and economic perspective, the United States can best serve
its cause by working with others to achieve harmonized, multilateral export
controls that can stem the rise of precursor proliferation.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because unilateral export controls are ineffective, the United States has
joined other industrial nations in forging multilateral export controls, which
include dual-use precursors. Even so, applying a traditional export control
regime to control weapons proliferation is a flawed policy resting on
incorrect assumptions, and thus can never be an entirely adequate answer.
In recognition, the United States advocates a complete ban to achieve the
overall objective of halting chemical weapons use and development.
Export controls should be part of a larger regime that would combine
stringent, independent compliance with enforcement mechanisms in order
to gain widespread adherence among nations.
A. Multilateral Measures
1. The Australia Group
To some extent, at least from a practical viewpoint, the United States
is cognizant that its unilateral controls cannot stop the development and
proliferation of chemical precursors on a global level and that such a
regime only puts the United States chemical industry at a competitive
disadvantage in a global market.2w Therefore, the United States has
sought to promote multilateral efforts to achieve a workable international
regime. The Australia Group, formed in 1984 and chaired by the
Australian government, is composed of an informal body of some twenty-
two chemical-producing countries2°' whose purpose is to adopt multilat-
eral measures to contain proliferation by restricting trade in chemical
precursors. 2w Working within their consensual arrangement, the Group
200. See discussion supra part V.
201. M. DEVAUGH, SuMMARY Of U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION CONTROLS, COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 324-25 (1990); COMMERCIAL LAW AND HANDBOOK SERIES No.
530 (1990).
202. DEVAUGH, supra note 201, at 325 (Currently there are nine precursors on the Core
List, and forty-one on the Warning List.).
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identifies specific precursors and then attempts to harmonize their
respective domestic export controls. Currently there are fifty precursors
that have been identified; for those precursors on the Core List Group,
members have agreed to impose direct export controls, while for those on
the Warning List, members are to provide administrative guidance to their
domestic chemical industries.2°3
2. New United States Legislation
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimina-
tion Act of 199124 focuses on multinational measures to prohibit the use
and proliferation of chemical arms and encourages the international
community to use international sanctions against both governments that
resort to chemical warfare and private firms that aid in the proliferation of
chemical weapons. °' The 1991 Act also encourages an internationally
coordinated effort to achieve a comprehensive treaty to ban all chemical
weapons use, development, production, and stockpiling.2 6 At the same
time the 1991 Act seeks to strengthen the international regime with the
Australia Group and with other supplier nations helping to devise more
effective controls on goods and technology applicable to chemical weapons
production.2' With respect to the latter, the 1991 Act establishes (1) a
"harmonized" list of export controls among the Australia Group nations;
(2) a public, unclassified "warning" list for precursors; and (3) a "denial"
list for firms and individuals who violate the export controls of the
Australia Group.' Lastly, the 1991 Act calls for effective international
monitoring of commerce in precursors, as well as other goods and
technology that advance chemical weapons, and adoption of tougher
203. Id at 327. In March 1991, the United States included all fifty precursors on its
Commodity Control List, which requires a validated license for shipments to nations
outside the Australia Group. See discussion supra part IV.
204. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1245-1258 (codified as amended in sections of 22
U.S.C. §§ 5601-5606 & 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2410.); see supra part IV.B.
205. 22 U.S.C. § 5601(1) (1993) (The 1991 Act sets out various sanctions against
governments who resort to chemical warfare, including termination of foreign aid,
termination of arms sales, denial of United States government credit, import restrictions,
withdrawal of diplomatic relations, and withdrawal of United States landing rights.).
206. Id. § 5601(2)
207. I § 5601(3).
208. Id § 5602(b)(3)(A)-(F).
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multilateral sanctions against firms and individuals who violate export
controls.2'
Generally, the 1991 Act is a laudable effort by the United States to
contain the spread of chemical precursors for chemical weapons. To the
extent the United States is working with other sovereign nations on an
equal footing this will translate into a more effective international regime
and will also go far in alleviating tension and conflict over relative power
imbalances when competing jurisdictions are asserted. '
It is still unclear, however, how well the 1991 Act will control the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and their precursors.
Some conspicuous problems remain unresolved. The Australia Group is
a consensual arrangement only; there are no binding legal obligations to
control exports. Further, if any member is lax in enforcing its domestic
controls, as Germany has been with its chemical and allied firms, there is
no international regime in place to deal with either the sovereign member
or the private firms. This leaves the United States with the option to apply
sanctions unilaterally either against an offending supplier country or the
private firms themselves. But this is not a healthy choice because it forces
the United States to choose between its commitment to prevent prolifera-
tion and its economic well-being. Sanctions such as denial of United
States market access to offending foreign firms will necessarily disrupt
trade flows and harm United States firms in innumerable ways. Politically,
it will also be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion appropriate economic
sanctions to impose upon governments, particularly if they are merely lax
in enforcement of controls on precursors. This is especially true for
Australia Group countries that are long-time allies and major trading
partners of the United States. One can well-imagine what could happen if
the United States, for example, put import restrictions on certain German
goods as a penalty against the German government for taking no action as
its firms sold millions of dollars in chemical weaponry capability to Iraq
and Libya. Clearly such economic sanctions would be viewed as
disproportionate, a probable breach of a GATT treaty obligation, and would
most likely lead to escalating retaliations, thus negatively impacting United
States economic and political interests.
Another major problem with existing multilateral measures is the
absence of an international mechanism to determine if precursors (along
209. l § 5602(a)(3)-(4).
210. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 74 (The most effective means available to states
to resolve competing jurisdiction claims is to harmonize their underlying substantive
policies.).
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with other goods or technology) are being diverted for malevolent uses.
The existing twenty-two-member Australia Group, although having a great
deal of chemical production concentrated among them, cannot realistically
monitor all sales in such a rapidly expanding and diverse global market.
Realistically, much of the multilateral attempts by the leading industrial
nations of the Australia Group still fall short.
In the final analysis, the current approach of applying traditional
export controls to counter the problem of lethal chemical weapons
proliferation fails because it is inherently flawed. It is based upon two
assumptions, neither of which are correct. First, that nations such as the
United States can readily distinguish the controllers from the targets of
control because in the real world today's ally may be tomorrow's enemy.
To assume otherwise denies hundreds of years of human history and
common sense as well. One need only point to United States-Iraqi
relations of the last decade to illustrate the fundamental volatility of
relations among sovereigns.
Second, that since the West was successful, by and large, over the past
forty years in substantially thwarting advanced technology from entering
the Soviet Bloc, the western industrial nations can apply the same regime
to keep lethal chemical weapons from proliferating in other countries it
deems unworthy or suspect. But, unlike the narrowly focused targets of
East-West controls, many technologies and chemical agents are included
under proliferation controls, and they have diffused among many more
nations. Accordingly, the mechanisms and the channels of transfer, while
already proving difficult to manage, will become even more porous as we
head into the twenty-first century. Thus, while harmonized multilateral
export controls can achieve a great deal, they are not, by themselves, a
definitive answer.
The 1991 Act addressed these shortcomings, but only to the extent
possible by unilateral action. The Congress recognized that beyond
multilateral export controls the United States must work towards a broad-
based, international regime of compliance and enforcement in order to
effectuate the stated policy objective and, importantly, to lessen the
negative economic impact to United States business. On the other hand,
the 1991 Act can only provide a general framework in which to build a
multilateral consensus for compliance and enforcement mechanisms. So,
while not an answer to this dilemma, the 1991 Act has at least signaled to
others the seriousness of United States intentions to promote and create
international mechanisms equal to the objective of controlling the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and their precursors.
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B. The Draft Convention
The Draft Convention is the most comprehensive, far-reaching
response by the international community to arms control.211 Both scope
and intent are well beyond the international norm against first use set by
the Geneva Protocol. In addition to renouncing all use of lethal chemical
warfare, the Draft, recognizing the continuing dangerous levels of
proliferation, mandates several exacting obligations of contracting parties.
All production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are forbidden,22 and
once in force the contracting parties will have ten years to destroy entirely
and dismantle their chemical weapons arsenals and facilities.2 3  A
detailed accounting of specific chemical weapons capability existing within
each territory2 4 must be provided within thirty days after the treaty
enters into force, as well as continued yearly updates.2 5 Further, parties
are required to furnish updated information on dual-use chemicals that may
be adopted for military uses.26 To safeguard states' compliance with
these obligations, the Draft creates, as independent authority, 'The
International Inspectorate,' which will have the right to unimpeded on-site
inspections.217 Lastly, the Draft mandates that no party shall "assist,
encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited
to the parties."
218
Mindful of the present state of affairs, this is an impressive effort to
bring chemical weapons under a complete international ban. The Draft
rightfully rejects the deterrence model of the Geneva Protocol as outmoded
and incapable of containing the global threat that such weapons present
today. It recognizes that chemical weapons are unique, and unlike
211. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 21; see also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/881, Feb. 3, 1989 [hereinafter
Report of Ad Hoc Committee].
212. Report of Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 211, arts. 1.5., 1.6.
213. Id arts. IV.5., V.8.
214. Id art. In.
215. Koplow, supra note 50, at 55 ("[S]uch information will include locations,
quantities, and inventories of not only chemical weapons but also disclosure of ownership,
operation, capacity, layout, and equipment of every chemical weapon plant.").
216. Id. (Reporting requirements encompass statistical information concerning each
facility's production, consumption, and imports and exports of controlled chemicals.).
217. Id. at 55-56 (Parties will be bound to allow such continuous inspections throughout
the period of installations of automatic instruments wherever chemical weapons are
produced and stored to ensure that only appropriate functions are continuing.).
218. Id. at 56.
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conventional arms, that the potential exists for unleashing vast devastation
and structural changes to the natural order. Once the treaty goes into
force219 it will carry great weight in the international community, both
politically and legally. The more signatories, the more moral force will be
gathered, making it that much harder for any one nation to use such
weapons without incurring the collective wrath of the civilized world. To
the extent that contracting states will be sanctioning an elaborate and quite
intrusive regime to ensure compliance, this will resolve the inherent
conflict of intervention in the internal affairs of individual sovereign
nations. No single nation will be intruding into the domestic affairs of
another; rather contracting states will relinquish some sovereignty in return
for an international authority that will ensure verification. This will tend
to enhance and reinforce the international legal order because the treaty is
rooted in consensus, not coercion. With a widespread, harmonized policy,
the dilemma of regulating the MNEs, key players in the international
chemical market, will be largely averted. Moreover, only the weight of an
aggressive enforcement regime coordinated and carried out collectively will
curtail individual states while fairly allocating the economic burden such
enforcement may well entail. Lastly, from a legal perspective, the
conclusion of a treaty, undertaken by many of the leading nations, will
contribute to progressive law by evidencing widespread state practice. In
time, even non-signatories will be held to the international norm that
eventually develops under the Convention regime.
C. Some Final Reflections on a Total Ban
The concept of a total ban on armaments is not new in international
arms control but, as the Biological Weapons Convention demonstrates, it
has been more elusive in fact. We know that even when nations are in
relative agreement as to the immortality and repugnancy of certain
armaments, such as biological or chemical weapons, they face a major
dilemma. Should a total ban be sought, and if so, how best to provide for
verification and enforcement procedures that will engender trust and
adherence, which is so crucial for compliance and without such teeth a
deterrence capability, such as permitted under the Geneva Protocol, serves
as the only realistic alternative.' 2
219. See James M. Markham, Chemical Weapons Talks Facing Tough Hurdles, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1989, at A1O (The Draft Convention will enter into force upon the
ratification of sixty nations.).
220. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 23 n.78.
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conceptualize, categorize,
and evaluate various procedures for verification and enforcement, some
comments and observations of a more general nature can be articulat-
ed.22 The Draft Convention is the first serious attempt by our global
community in seventy years to tackle difficult and intricate problems that
must be addressed.' It seems clear that only a complete ban can halt
the scientific march into the unknown. Unlike nuclear weapons, which
stand as a powerful harbinger of what might come, the time and opportuni-
ty to put the chemical weapons genie back in the bottle still exists.'
Yet because chemical agents, such as dual-use precursors, and facilities for
production and development are so widespread and adaptable, no arms
treaty can remove all risk-some risk in a verification regime is inescap-
able. The task is to strike a balance of acceptable risk, as the Draft
attempts to do. Even if the notion of structuring an arms treaty on less
than a full ability to verify compliance is considered anathema to long-held
views on arms control, it must be emphasized that the goal is a total
disarmament convention, not an arms control regime, and as such, new and
creative thinking must be applied. The concept of an Independent
Inspectorate is an excellent example and provides a new means to
achieving the confidence building that is so important to overall success.
Additionally, in formulating what is acceptable risk it seems entirely
appropriate to take into account that conventional armaments are already
a significant deterrence factor, at least for those nations like the United
States that have well-developed conventional arsenals. 2 ' Can one
reasonably doubt that the extensive array of conventional weapons amassed
against Iraq in the recent Persian Gulf War was not a major deterrent when
Iraq assessed the risks in choosing whether or not to use chemical warfare?
Beyond this, one need only look to the alternative and the current
status quo under the Geneva Protocol to weigh the risks of passivity, even
if only imperfect compliance is possible. Although, to this point, there are
no chemical arms that can alter the natural order or that are as devastating
as nuclear arms, the prospect is chilling to ponder. Common sense dictates
221. See generally Koplow, supra note 50 (for a detailed discussion of the compliance
regime as laid out in the Draft Convention and how extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction
may be applied to it).
222. See id at 4.
223. See Elliot Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal Scholars on the Legal Status of
Nuclear Weapons, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 111 (1988) (Some commentators have challenged
nuclear weapons as possibly unlawful under the laws of war since they can annihilate
entire civilian populations and have the capability to effectively destroy the world.).
224. Presumably, this is why nations, especially weaker nations, form military alliances.
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that if the international community continues to allow scientific develop-
ment, nuclear-strength chemical weapons could well be the ultimate
result-just as continuing proliferation of existing chemical arms provides
greater opportunity for their use.
For the first time, private interests must also be subject to whatever
compliance regime is instituted. While this is crucial, there also needs to
be a careful analysis to distinguish among those measures necessary to
prohibit development and spread of dangerous precursors, and those that
would unduly inhibit legitimate commercial concerns. For instance,
adequate protection of commercial secrets and customer lists is imperative,
otherwise we impair an important industry.' Additionally, mandatory
harmonized export controls for all signatories must be part of an overall
regime to harness effectively dual-use precursors.
In contemplating an effective enforcement regime, force must be ruled
out from the outset. The ends rarely justify the means, and allowing
violence will only foster more of the same. Rather, there are many
sanctions that can promote sufficient disincentives for state or private
actions that seek to circumvent the obligations of a disarmament treaty.
The key is that such measures must be applied consistently and uniformly
by all signatories.'"6 One obvious rule of thumb is to fashion levels of
sanctions that are at once reasonable and proportional to the actual
violation, yet swiftly and decisively carried out. Here again, an interna-
tional mechanism must be in place that can independently verify whether
225. The International Inspectorate as set out in the Draft Convention would seem well-
suited as an honest broker and, with appropriate safeguards, able to protect confidential
information and technology belonging to commercial chemical concerns. See Koplow,
supra note 50, at 61 n.273 (noting that it is also wise to be cautious for political reasons
as the chemical industry in the United States would be a powerful adversary for any arms
control effort, as it was against the Geneva Protocol in the 1920s; but the chemical industry
so far has been supportive and has aided the United States in developing measures to
execute an effective solution in addition to being actively involved in the draft negotia-
tions).
226. See supra notes 100-03. There is a recognition among nations that economic
sanctions can be an effective means of influencing the behavior of a targeted state. There
are even a minority of commentators who argue that economic sanctions can effect a state
to such a degree so as to amount to economic coercion and possibly violate of the United
Nations Charter. U.N. CHRTE art. 2, 14 (prohibiting threat or use of force against any
nation in any manner that is inconsistent with the Charter). Thus the scope of the term
"force" would include economic coercion. See Henderson, supra note 100, at 180-97
(arguing that a more expansive reading of Article 2, paragraph 4, albeit a minority view,




chemical weapons have been used or whether prohibited research and
development is occurring.
None of this will be easy. Invariably, problems will arise over
whether a party is breaking an obligation. In the case of Rabta, Libya,
where western technology was enlisted to build a chemical weapons
facility, would a penalty against the German fmns who violated domestic
controls be sufficient, or should Germany be held strictly liable? And if
not, where should the line be drawn beyond which a state may not cross?
And lest the United States be too eager to draw that line, one need only
point to the current allegations that the United States intentionally
condoned billions of dollars in agricultural credits that went directly to an
Iraqi weapons build-up to realize just how difficult it will be for potential
signatories to define what are acceptable boundaries. Perhaps the situation
in Iraq best illustrates the extreme difficulty the international community
faces when attempting to enforce verification compliance on a recalcitrant
nation. Under the terms of the cease-fire in the Persian Gulf War, Iraq was
required to scrap all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
facilities and to allow independent United Nations verification of their total
destruction. 7 Yet over a year later Iraq has been intentionally thwarting
the United Nations by not fully disclosing such weapons and facilities,
presumably in hopes of hiding them and thus clandestinely carrying on its
weapons program.' 2 To its credit, the intransigence and obfuscation of
227. U.N. Security Council Declares Cease-Fire Ending Gulf War, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 1991, at A32 (This reported on United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 687,
which established a permanent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf War, continued the embargo
on all nonessential civilian goods, and compelled Iraq to surrender all weapons of mass
destruction, including its stocks of poison gas, biological weapons and materials; as well
as mandating that Iraq foreswear any related research and allowing the destruction of
weapons research and production facilities. The terms of No. 687 also set out a 120-day
timetable for Iraq to list all the locations, amounts, and types of all its chemical and
biological weapons; for the United Nations to develop a plan for inspecting and destroying
all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; and for the United Nations Security Council to
create new measures for enforcing the existing arms embargo against Iraq. See also U.N.
Experts Set to Inspect Iraq's A-Sites; Visit a First Step in Arms Destruction, WASH. POST,
May 16, 1991, at A34 (reporting that a 34-member team of international specialists had
arrived in Iraq for a week of onsite inspections of nuclear weapons and that an inventory
and destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons would occur later; and that Iraq, under the
United Nations mandate, had reported a chemical weapons arsenal considerably larger than
previous United States estimates).
228. The Inspector Calls, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 45 (This reported on the bus
siege by Iraq on United Nations inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
when officials attempted to leave with documents that directly evidenced a superior Iraqi
nuclear capability and that such an affront to the United Nations could not go unchal-
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Iraq has been met by a stiffened resolve by the United Nations and the
Security Council. Iraq has remained under a virtually total economic and
trade embargo since it first invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and the
legitimate threat by the Security Council to use military force to ensure
compliance with all United Nations resolutions is finally compelling Iraq
to capitulate, albeit slowly and in piecemeal fashion.229 Thus, through
deliberate and widely adhered to concerted action, Iraq has been success-
fully isolated and its aberrant behavior rightfully punished and condemned.
This in itself is an important achievement for the international legal order.
The unfolding of the Iraq drama also illustrates the increased
credibility and stature of the United Nations, which has set new precedents
and advanced the international legal order. The unanimous resolve of the
Security Council to force Iraqi compliance is impressive-notwithstanding
that it is in part the consequence of the changing dynamics between the
two superpowers resulting from the dramatic changes underway within the
Soviet empire. For the first time since World War II, Russia and the
United States' are allied in coercing a renegade nation to bend to the
superior will of a united community. It is now realistic to contemplate a
continuation and strengthening of the unity in the Security Council, which
leaves open the possibility of a vastly more powerful United Nations
Moreover, with the United Nations now a more pivotal player, one can
envision that through its collective determination, sanctions will have a
greater likelihood of achieving selective objectives, when in the past,
sanctions have proven difficult to apply multilaterally. The efforts of the
lenged. Thus, the Security Council demanded that Iraq release the inspectors with all the
documentation, while the United States positioned itself for a military reaction if needed.).
229. Iraq Accused of Not Meeting U.N. Deadline, WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at A28
(reporting that Iraq was not fully complying with the United Nations requirements and had
not provided all the information about its weapons of mass destruction as mandated); see
The Inspectors Calls, supra note 228 (reporting that during this week Iraq had risked
armed confrontation with the United States and allied forces in an effort to protect Iraq's
nuclear weapons program and surmising that Iraq hopes that with enough obstruction and
delay the coalition will tire); see also R. Jeffrey Smith & Michael Z. Wise, Report Shows
Extensive Iraqi Nuclear Effort, WASH. POsT, Oct. 5, 1991, at AI (reporting that United
Nations inspectors, after seizing Iraqi nuclear program documents, found that Iraq's nuclear
program was "supported by broad-based international procurement efforts"); see Damned
Elusive, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 46 (This reported that another team of inspectors
from the United Nations arrived in Iraq believing that a still undiscovered, undeclared
nuclear weapons site probably exists. This resulted from the Security Council vote on
October 11, 1991, extending indefinitely its inspection-destruction regime due to Iraq's
obstructionism.).
230. See Koplow, supra note 50, at 4 n.8, 9, 23 n.79.
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United Nations and Security Council to render humanitarian aid and
protection to the Kurdish population of Iraq when they were faced with the
possible annihilation also signals that the international community may be
more apt to discount the sanctity of territorial sovereignty when millions
of civilian lives hang in the balance. Thus, a new international minimum
standard may be evolving in the area of human rights.23'
All this bodes well for achieving a strong chemical weapons conven-
tion with an independent verification and enforcement regime. With the
new precedents created by the Iraqi situation, a chemical weapons treaty
can provide a further opportunity to establish and strengthen collective
actions and enhance the legitimacy of various extraterritorial acts. In this
regard, actions under a treaty would be much like actions of the United
Nations Security Council.
Finally, a word should be said about the issue of non-signatories to a
new chemical weapons convention, especially when arguments will be
raised to defeat a total ban based upon those who refuse to sign onto a
comprehensive convention. First, it is important to emphasize that one
hundred nations have signed the Geneva Protocol, and, as recently as 1989,
over one hundred states gathered in Paris for a conference to deliberate on
the increasing problem of proliferation. There, nations resolved to seek a
total ban, and there is every reason to believe that the near catastrophe
averted in the Gulf War will serve to strengthen such resolve to address
fully the entire problem. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the vast
majority of states will sign onto a comprehensive treaty such as the Draft
Convention and willingly forfeit a precious bit of their territorial sovereign-
ty to ensure an adequate verification mechanism. Smaller and militarily
weaker states have the most to gain by the increased protection offered,
while stronger nations like the United States gain from the elimination of
potentially greater risks down the road. As to those who refuse to sign on,
the status of a multilateral convention (as discussed supra) that is so
widely accepted is more apt to become customary international law in a
much shorter time period.3 2 In the interim, signatories can respond
firmly with provisions in their own export controls for automatic placement
of all non-signatories in a prohibited destination category that will prohibit
the export of all chemical weapons capabilities and provide for monitoring
of all chemical sales and technology. In this way, non-signatories will be
made to pay an economic consequence for the decision to remain outside
a disarmament convention.233
231. See supra note 139.
232. See supra part Il.D. and note 93; Koplow, supra note 50, at 67 n.289.
233. See supra note 119 (current United States law provides that chemical weapons,
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to articulate the clear and growing danger
that chemical weapons present to the international community and cast
some light on the forces driving this environment. Past efforts, such as the
Geneva Protocol, are incapable of providing an acceptable resolution for
today, and United States export controls are equally inadequate, causing
more harm than good. Once viewed as aberrant behavior, lethal chemical
warfare is now viewed by some states as a viable military alternative with
distinct tactical advantages. Meanwhile, continual research and develop-
ment ensures fertility to future generations of chemical arms.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States is in a unique
position to promote the complete eradication and ban of all chemical
weapons, including restrictions on dual-use chemical precursors and their
further development, which will inevitably occur without such restraints.
The United States should seize upon the genuine goodwill felt around the
world to strengthen and build upon the international legal order. Although
a complex challenge confronts the United States and the international
community, collective efforts and united resolve must be applied. Even
though a comprehensive treaty will not be risk-free, it is our best guarantee
of global security.
precursors, and technology are strictly prohibited for export to Iraq); see Koplow, supra
note 50, at 59 n.255 (Proposals have been put forth to introduce a public blacklist of those
countries that are trying to gain chemical weapons capability which would automatically
trigger sanctions such as loss of financial aid and credit; the United States position is that
the treaty should not enter into force without adherence by all "chemical weapons capable
states.").
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